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The United Nations Watercourses
Convention on the Dawn of Entry
Into Force
Ryan B. Stoa*
ABSTRACT
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses (Watercourses
Convention) entered into force in August 2014. Despite
overwhelming support when signed in 1997, the ratification
process has been slow. As a binding treaty, the Watercourses
Convention provides hope that its provisions will articulate
legal principles of transboundarywater management capable of
promoting cooperation and regional agreements. Despite entry
into force, however, global support for the Watercourses
Convention is weak, concurrent efforts to develop treaty regimes
governing water resources create competition for resources and
may obscure understandings of international water law, and
the foundational principles of the Watercourses Convention
remain ambiguous. A case study of the discordanthydropolitics
of the Nile River Basin-perhaps the most significant
watercourse lacking a cooperative management agreement-best
illustrates these limitations. This Article provides an analysis of
internationalwater law and the limitations of the Watercourses
Convention, considering the implications of entry into force.
While the Watercourses Convention creates a workable
framework for negotiating regional agreements, low levels of
support from UN member states, competing treaty instruments,
and ambiguous legal principles limit the potential impact of the
Watercourses Convention.

* Ryan B. Stoa is the Deputy Director of the Global Water for Sustainability
Program and a Fellow in Water Law and Policy at the Florida International University
College of Law. Contact: rstoa@fiu.edu. The author is grateful for research assistance
provided by Sylmarie Trujillo and Sharon Merrill.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourses
Convention) was presented to the UN General Assembly in 1997, it
was met with overwhelming support. One hundred and six countries
voted in favor of the Convention, with only three countries opposed.'
At the time, there was optimism that the Watercourses Convention
would provide states with a robust treaty codifying a clear set of
customary principles of international water law, and establish a
foundation for site-specific regional agreements. The 1990s were a
period of significant growth in the international environmental field,
with several agreements providing meaningful frameworks for
resolving complex environmental
challenges,
including the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2 the Convention to Combat
Desertification, 3 the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4 and
Kyoto Protocol. 5 Amidst such efforts, the Watercourses Convention
lacked the attention and political capital necessary to build on the

1.
G.A. Res. 51/229, at 1, U.N. Doc. AJRES/51/206 (May 21, 1997).
2.
All United Nations member states-except the United States and
Andorra-are party to the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79.
3.
All United Nations member states are party to the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Oct. 14, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3.
4.
All United Nations member states are party to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
5.
All United Nations member states-except the United States, Andorra,
Canada, and South Sudan-are party to the Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303
U.N.T.S. 161.
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Watercourses Convention's initial support, and therefore did not
move quickly towards entry into force. After seventeen years, the
Watercourses Convention finally entered into force and attained
binding treaty status on August 17, 2014.6
Slow progress in the development of binding international water
law is not for lack of need. Ninety percent of the world's population
lives in a country that contains transboundary surface waters, and
two billion people depend on groundwater for their survival. 7
Meanwhile, most of the world's 5638 transboundary watercourses
lack a cooperative management framework. 9 With water serving
important needs for domestic and municipal water supply,
agricultural irrigation, industrial production, energy development,
transportation, recreation, and commercial use, transboundary water
resources have the potential to be an escalating source of conflict
between states. An international agreement creating a framework for
cooperation-while codifying customary rules and norms-presents
an opportunity to mitigate conflict and promote cooperation.
The Watercourses Convention, however, has not provided the
framework or legal clarity hoped for by its drafters and early
supporters. Three dynamics support this conclusion.
First, it is self-evident that ratification of the agreement has
been slow, despite a friendly climate for international agreement
formation. The pace of ratification may be explained by several
inhibiting factors, including treaty congestion and lack of
leadership. 10 More problematic is the possibility that the
Watercourses Convention's non-binding status is due to a deliberate
lack of support from states that originally voted in favor of the

Status of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
6.
InternationalWatercourses, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION [hereinafter Status
of Watercourses Convention], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSGVolume
%2011/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII-12.en.pdf [http://perma.cclR6SP-X9B5] (archived Sept.
13, 2014).

See TransboundaryWaters: SharingBenefits, Sharing Responsibilities,UN.
7.
WATER 1 (2008), http://www.unwater.org/downloadsfUNWTRANSBOUNDARY.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5MJU-TS6E] (archived Sept. 12, 2014) ("[O]ver 90 per cent [of the
world's population] lives in countries that share basins.").
See id. (noting that many of the world's 263 transboundary lakes and
8.
rivers, and 300 transboundary aquifers have "[d]epleted and degraded freshwater
supplies" due to poor management and governance).
See id.; see also UN-Water, Managing Water Under Uncertainty and Rish:
9.
The United Nations World Water Development Report 4, UNITED NATIONS EDUC.
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG. 215-16 (2012), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/
002156/215644e.pdf [http://perma.cclL89K-E8MA] (archived Sept. 13, 2014) (explaining
that only forty percent of international basins have an agreement in place to
cooperatively manage their use).
See Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Flavia Rocha Loures, Still Not in Force: Should
10.
States Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention?, 18 REV. OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 185, 192-93 (2009).
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Watercourses Convention in the General Assembly seventeen years
ago.
Second, despite the Watercourses Convention's distinction as the
international community's framework freshwater treaty, other legal
instruments have emerged in an attempt to fill the gap created by the
Watercourses Convention's slow march towards entry into force. The
1992 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes" (UNECE Water Convention)
was amended in 2003 to allow accession by all UN member states.
Meanwhile, the 2008 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers' 2 (Draft Articles) attempts to create its own legal regime for
groundwater resources. Both instruments overlap and conflict with
the Watercourses Convention in significant ways.
Third, the two foundations of the Watercourses Convention-(1)
the right to an equitable use of water resources and (2) the obligation
not to cause significant harm to other watercourse states-are
inherently in tension with each other, and do not establish
meaningful rules for states in conflict over water resources. The
principles are considered the foundations of international water law
in general,' 3 and provide an impetus for agreement between states
primed for cooperation. But the lack of clarity between the principle
of equitable use and the principle of no significant harm does not
contribute to agreement formation between states in protracted and
complex conflicts over water resources, the resolutions of which are
undoubtedly a goal of the Watercourses Convention.14 Instead, these
principles can be used to support incompatible positions between
upstream and downstream states, taking negotiations further away
from an agreement.
Nowhere are the Watercourses Convention's limitations more
apparent than in the geopolitical asperity of the Nile River Basin. For
centuries, the flow of water in the Nile River has been entirely

11.
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269 [hereinafter UNECE Water
Convention].
12.
GAOR, The Law of Transboundary Aquifers: Title and Texts of the
Preamble and Draft Articles 1 to 19 on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers Adopted, on
Second Reading, by the Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.724 (May 29, 2008)
[hereinafter Draft Articles].
13.
The principles of equitable use and no significant harm predate the UN
Watercourses Convention, are contained in other legal instruments such as the
UNECE Water Convention and the Draft Articles, and are codified in documents
enumerating customary international water laws.
14.
See Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, at 2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/51/229 (July 8, 1997)
[hereinafter UN Watercourses Convention] ("[A] framework convention will ensure the
utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international
watercourses.").

20141

UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE

1325

appropriated or claimed by Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Sudan, due
to colonial-era treaties for which justifications are most likely
obsolete. But Egypt and Sudan do not merely assert their rights
under these treaties; they reinforce those rights by invoking the
principle of no significant harm's prohibition on adverse impacts to
their allocations. Facing increasing water scarcity, meanwhile,
upstream states are increasingly assertive of their rights to an
equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile River's water
resources. Unable to resolve the inherent tensions between the two
principles, the states have resorted to creating an entirely new legal
principle-water security. The definition of water security is disputed
and leaves the Nile River Basin without a cooperative management
agreement.
There is, however, reason for optimism. With thirty-five member
parties, the Watercourses Convention is in force and increasingly
relevant. There is reason to believe that many states do not have
substantive objections to the text of the Watercourses Convention,
and are prepared to accede with the support of international political
capital and momentum. Entry into force of the treaty may provide
such an impetus. Even if it does not, attaining binding status confers
upon the Watercourses Convention, and its principles, a degree of
legitimacy that may have been eroding due to its perennial nonbinding status. Entry into force may also help stem the tide against
the rise of competing legal instruments with overlapping mandates,
while forcing states, courts, and scholars to weigh in on the equitable
use/no significant harm debate. Increased attention may establish or
reinforce a consensus interpretation capable of resolving disputes and
fostering cooperation. Finally, while the Nile River Basin provides a
disconcerting example of the limitations of international water law,
there is evidence that the Watercourses Convention is already
providing a framework for cooperation in regions where hydropolitics
are not as divisive.
This Article provides an analysis of the Watercourses Convention
at a crucial moment in the development of international water lawentry into force of the UN's framework international freshwater
treaty. In Part I, a historical review of the development of
international water law provides context for the Watercourses
Convention's creation and entry into force, as well as the current
state of international water law. In Part II, three limitations of the
Watercourses Convention are explored in detail: (1) a troubling lack
of support for, and pace of, entry into force; (2) competing legal
instruments with overlapping mandates; and (3) inherent tensions
between the foundational principles of equitable use and no
significant harm. In Part III, a case study of the discord over water
management in the Nile River Basin highlights the limitations of the
Watercourses Convention. Part IV concludes the article by
considering the implications of the Watercourses Convention's entry
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into force for international water law, the international community,
and freshwater resources. This Article argues that while the
Watercourses Convention creates a workable framework for
negotiating regional agreements, entry into force will not be a
panacea for the limitations of the Watercourses Convention. Further
support will be needed to develop and reinforce the foundations of
international water law.

II. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
Water laws have played a role in human society for millennia.
Access to water resources is a primary characteristic of the earliest
human settlements; rules governing water use may have predated
property regimes for land in some areas.1 5 Water laws are reflected in
traditional Islamic and Jewish religious texts and played a central
role in the development of many historically influential cities like
Rome, London, and New York City.16 Many of these early laws were
tailored to a particular community or localized water resource, such
that water resources have historically been regulated by local,
regional, or national institutions and legal instruments.
International water laws, on the other hand, are a relatively
recent product. Though treaties that were tangentially related to
transboundary water governance occasionally developed early
international water law, 17 water resources were historically
considered abundant, and allocation schemes were rudimentary and
scarcely enforced. In 1966, however, the International Law
Association (ILA) convened in Helsinki, Finland, to create the
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers
(Helsinki Rules).' 8 The goal of the rules was to codify customary legal
norms and principles, in addition to setting in motion further
development of international water law. Given the preliminary
nature of the endeavor, the Helsinki Rules were appropriately modest
in their ambition, establishing the groundwork for future action and
establishing principles of water law that reflected prevailing notions
of water resources management.

15.
See James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE
J.L. & HuMAN. 94, 99 (Special Issue 2006) (discussing the history of water laws as far
back as the Old Testament).
16.
See generally id. (describing water laws for various cultures and cities).
17.
See, e.g., Convention Relative to the Development of Hydraulic Power
Affecting More Than One State, and Protocol of Signature, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1926).
18.
See Int'l Law Ass'n, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
InternationalRivers, UNITED NATIONS EDUC. SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG. 1 (1966)
[hereinafter
Helsinki Rules], http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/pdfl
educationaltools/course modules/reference documents/internationalregionconventions
/helsinkirules.pdf [http://perma.cc/3Q67-P3L3] (archived Sept. 13, 2014).
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The most significant principle-that of equitable and reasonable
utilization of water resources, or "equitable use"-was prevalent in
many national legal settings, 19 and by itself did not present
controversy. The principle of equitable use in the Helsinki Rules
states that "each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of
an international drainage basin."20 In other words, states may use
water resources as long as their use is reasonable and beneficial.
Equitable use has since become a central pillar supporting the
international water law regime by stipulating that a basin state (a
state whose territory includes any portion of an international
watercourse) has a right to beneficial uses of its water resource.
By its nature, however, equitable use is not without its
limitations. The Helsinki Rules made clear that while states are
entitled to an equitable share of water resources, that share is to be
determined by weighing the relevant factors of each particular case,
21
including geography, hydrology, population, past utilization, etc.
Included as an enumerated factor is the "degree to which the needs of
a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to
a co-basin State."22 In a sense, this provision was the seed that would
become the principle of no significant harm. At the time, however, the
idea that a state should refrain from using water resources because it
may have deleterious impacts on co-riparians was merely a factor to
consider in case-specific determinations of what constitutes an
equitable use. There was little debate that the principle of reasonable
and equitable use of shared water resources represented the heart of
the Helsinki Rules.
While the Helsinki Rules provided an important first step in the
development of international water law by codifying customary rules
and norms, the international community recognized that further
progress would come from a binding treaty framework. In 1970, the
United Nations General Assembly requested the International Law
Commission (ILC) conduct a study of the law of international
23
watercourses with an eye towards codification and treaty formation.
The ILC submitted its draft articles, governing surface waters and

See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 46th Sess., May 2-July 22, 1994, U.N.
19.
Doc. A/49/10; 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 96-100 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2) ("Watercourse States
shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable
and reasonable manner.").
Helsinki Rules, supranote 18, art. IV.
20.
Id. art. V(II).
21.
Id. art. V(II)(11).
22.
See Progressive Development and Codification of the Rules of International
23.
Law Relating to International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 2669 (XXV)(1), at 88, 25th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8202 (Dec. 8, 1970) (recommending that the Commission conduct the
study "with a view to its progressive development and codification" and swift
implementation).
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unconfined groundwaters, to the General Assembly in 1994, along
with a supplemental resolution governing confined groundwaters. 24
The General Assembly continued negotiations for several years before
adopting the draft articles in 1997 as the Watercourses Convention
by a resolution vote of 106 in favor to three against. 25
The Watercourses Convention contains thirty-seven Articles
laying down basic norms of international water law. 26 The
cornerstone of the Watercourses Convention, however, is Article 5,
"Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and Participation."27 Echoing
the Helsinki Rules, Article 5 reasserts the equitable use principle,
while highlighting the concept of equitable participation to encourage
states to resolve issues of equitable use jointly and cooperatively. 28
The right of states to an equitable and reasonable utilization of a
watercourse is thus met with the duty to cooperate in its protection
and development. 29 Like the Helsinki Rules, Article 6 of the
Watercourses Convention enumerates a set of factors to guide
determinations of what constitutes an equitable use, including the
effects of a use on other watercourse states.3 0
The Watercourses Convention, however, departs from the
Helsinki Rules in one important respect: Article 7 creates a standalone obligation not to cause significant harm. 3' The principle of "no
significant harm" imposes a higher standard on basin states by
requiring them to refrain from taking actions that would cause
substantial damage to another state's water resources. If the damage
is unavoidable, the principle requires a state to compensate other
states for the damage. 82 The no significant harm principle may
prevent upstream states from using water resources--even if their
use is reasonable and beneficial-if downstream states would be
24.

See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational

Uses of International Watercourses, UN AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT'L L., 1-2 (2008),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdflhalclnuiw/clnuiw_e.pdf [http://perma.cclU78F-YEEJ] (archived
Sept. 12, 2014).
25.
The official UN recorded vote was 103 countries in favor; however,
Belgium, Fiji, and Nigeria later informed the Assembly they intended to vote in favor
of the Convention. FLAVIA LOURES, MARIE LAURE-VERCAMBRE & ALISTAIR RIEUCLARKE, EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE UN WATERCOURSES
CONVENTION, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND 24 (2009), available at http://www.gcint.org/sites/
default/files/publication/document/UN-Watercourses-Brochure- Eng. pdf [http://
perma.cc/JTD2-PWR7] (archived Sept. 13, 2014); see also Press Release, General
Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, U.N. Press Release GA/9248 (May 21, 1997) (detailing the
official vote count).
26.
UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14.
27.
See id. art. 5 (listing "[e]quitable and reasonable utilization and
participation" as the first general principle).
28.
Id.; see also Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, art. IV.
29.
UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(2).
30.
Id. art. 6.

31.

Id. art. 7.

32.

Id. art. 7(2).
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adversely affected. This can be problematic in cases- where, for
example, an upstream state decides to make reasonable use of a
transboundary river for basic sanitation purposes to the detriment of
a downstream state whose prior appropriations are diminished.
Accordingly, the no significant harm principle was presumably
favored by downstream states, and possibly a deal-breaker for those
states during negotiations.
The Watercourses Convention does not articulate a preference
between the principles of equitable use and no significant harm,
indicating that the principles should be viewed as complementary. To
that end, the Watercourses Convention relies on a general obligation
to cooperate. 33 Other provisions reinforce this sentiment, as
challenges posed by hydrologic installations, pollution, and dispute
resolution are to be addressed jointly and cooperatively; 34 state
actions with possible impacts on the watercourse must be
accompanied by notification and consultation procedures. 35 These
provisions calling on states to cooperate and strike a balance between
equitable use and no significant harm on a case-by-case basis may
have been sufficient to garner widespread support for the
Watercourses Convention in 1997. For reasons explored below,
however, state ratifications of the Watercourses Convention have
proceeded at a glacial pace, and entry into force took seventeen
years.3 6
Partly as a result of the Watercourses Convention's status in
limbo, the ILA reconvened in 2004 to synthesize customary
international water law in light of the Watercourses Convention and
the development of international environmental laws since the
adoption of the 1966 Helsinki Rules. The 2004 Berlin Rules on Water
Resources (Berlin Rules) 7 contributed several layers to the
development of international water law. First, the Berlin Rules
extended the applicability of international water laws to waters that
were purely national. 38 The right of public participation, the
obligation to use best efforts to achieve both conjunctive and
integrated management of waters, and duties to achieve
sustainability and the minimization of environmental harm are

Id. art. 8.
33.
Id. arts. 21, 26, 33.
34.
Id. arts. 11-19.
35.
See Status of Watercourses Convention, supra note 6 (the Convention was
36.
adopted by a General Assembly resolution in 1997 and did not enter into force until
2014).
GERHARD LoIBL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION BERLIN
37.
CONFERENCE (2004) WATER RESOURCES LAW, FOURTH REPORT (2004) [hereinafter
BERLIN RULES], available at http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/
ILABerlinRules-2004.pdf [http://perma.cclF474-JHBX] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
See id. art. 1 cmt. ("These Rules address the obligations of customary
38.
international law that govern the management of waters within a State as well as
transboundary waters.").
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either new or modified principles vis-A-vis the Helsinki Rules and the
Watercourses Convention; both restrict their scope to purely
international watercourses."

Importantly, the Berlin Rules maintained the dichotomy
between equitable use and no significant harm, but also attempted to
resolve the apparent tension between the two principles by
incorporating one into the other: "Basin States shall in their
respective territories manage the waters of an international drainage
basin in an equitable and reasonable manner having due regard for
the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin States."40
Reconciling the two principles requires a case-by-case balancing test.
Though "vital human needs" are given priority, no other use is per se
more preferable than another. Like the UN Watercourses
Convention, the Berlin Rules highlight the central role of the duty to
cooperate, suggesting that the principle underlies all other principles
of international water law. 4 1 In this context, it is possible to see the
duty to cooperate as the third pillar of international water law,
without which the pillars of equitable use and no significant harm
cannot stand.
Subsequent to the Berlin Rules, and in light of the Watercourses
Convention's limited progress, two other legal instruments emerged
to fill the void. The first was the UNECE's Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes (UNECE Water Convention). 42 The UNECE
Water Convention entered into force in 1996, prior to the adoption of
the Watercourses Convention. 43 Comparatively, the text of the

UNECE Water Convention is both more focused on reducing
transboundary impacts, and more specific regarding the actions
required to do so. While reasonable and equitable use is enumerated
as an appropriate measure for ensuring sound water management, its
placement in a list of other measures suggests it is on par with
environmental protection and restoration of ecosystems. 44 The
UNECE Water Convention has three guiding principles: the
precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and the principle
of generational equity.45 The UNECE Water Convention does not

39.
See id. arts. 5-8, 18 (discussing the principles of international law
governing water resources).
40.
Id. art. 12.
41.
See id. art. 11 (describing the duty to cooperate as "central to water
management").
42.
UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11.
43.
Id. at 270 n.1.
44.
See id. art. 2(2) (showing both principles as subsections under the same
article).
45.
See id. art. 2(5). The UNECE Water Convention describes the three
principles as follows:
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mention equitable use or no significant harm. Indeed, the UNESCE
Water Convention's emphasis on impact mitigation and conservation
is a philosophical contrast with the Watercourses Convention's more
utilization-minded approach.
Of course, one of the goals of the Watercourses Convention-and
international water law generally-is to provide a framework for
negotiating regional or site-specific agreements. In that context, the
UNECE Water Convention does not compete with the Watercourses
Convention as much as it reinforces the principle of subsidiarity and
decentralized water management.4 6 The UNECE Water Convention,
however, was amended in 2003 to allow ratification and participation
from states outside the UNECE region, " thus expanding the
potential scope of the UNECE Water Convention to all transboundary
watercourses. The amendment entered into force in 2013,48 making
the UNECE Water Convention a global framework agreement in the
same vein as the Watercourses Convention. The UNECE Water
Convention, however, has been in force for eighteen years, and is
49
robustly supported with funding and institutions.
The Parties shall be guided by the following principles: (a) The
precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the potential
transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall not be
postponed on the ground that scientific research has not fully proved a causal
link between those substances, on the one hand, and the potential
transboundary impact, on the other hand; (b) The polluter-pays principle, by
virtue of which costs of pollution prevention, control and reduction measures
shall be borne by the polluter; and (c) Water resources shall be managed so that
the needs of the present generation are met without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs.
See Ryan Stoa, Subsidiarity in Principle: Decentralization of Water
46.
Resources Management, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 31, 35 (2014) ("While not as explicitly
supportive of the principle of subsidiarity, the [UN Watercourses Convention] included
as a guiding principle the right of equitable participation .... ); Jeffrey S. Dornbos, All
(Water) Politics is Local: A Proposalfor Resolving TransboundaryWater Disputes, 22
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (2011) (asserting that the UN Watercourses
Convention, among other international agreements, promotes management at localized
levels).
47.
See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm'n for Europe,
Amendments to Articles 25 and 26 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, U.N. Doc. ECEIMP.WAT/14,
Annex, Decision III/1 (Jan. 12, 2004) ("Any other State, not referred to in paragraph 2,
that is a Member of the United Nations may accede to the Convention upon approval
by the Meeting of the Parties.").
U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Amendments to Articles
48.
25 and 26 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes - Entry into Force, U.N. Doc. C.N.639.2012.TREATIESXXVII.5.b (Nov. 14, 2012).
United Nations Economic Commission For Europe, The global opening of
49.
the 1992 UNECE Water Convention (Draft Version) at 2, 11 (Aug. 31, 2013),
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/brochure/Opening brochu
re.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ECD-3CZC] (archived Oct. 2, 2014) (discussing the various
institutional partners of the convention and the broad acceptance among countries
sharing transboundary waters within the jurisdiction of the UNECE).
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The second legal instrument to emerge in the wake of the
Watercourses Convention addresses transboundary aquifers, or
groundwater. In its definition of "watercourses," the Watercourses
Convention excludes confined aquifers, or groundwater that is not
hydrologically connected to surface waters. 50 Lacking a treaty
governing all types of groundwater, the UN's International Law
Commission produced the Draft Articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers in 2008.51 The Draft Articles elucidate some
relatively uncontroversial principles governing transboundary
aquifers (e.g., international and technical cooperation), while
reinforcing the principles of equitable use, no significant harm, and
cooperation. 5 2
Where the Draft Articles depart from previous understandings of
international water law is in Article 3. Article 3 provides that each
aquifer state has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary
aquifer or aquifer system located within its territory, in accordance
with international law.53 The Special Rapporteur to the ILC indicated
that the inclusion of this principle-which does not appear in the
Helsinki Rules, Watercourses Convention, or Berlin Rules-was a
necessary concession to aquifer states that hold the view that
aquifers are analogous to mineral resources and are governed by the
principle of territorial sovereignty.54 The United Nations' Sixth Legal
Committee convened in 2011 to determine if the Draft Articles were
ripe for a binding convention. 55 The Committee declined to move
forward, calling instead for further study and exploration of the
topic.56 The UN General Assembly considered the Draft Articles
again in December 2013, commending the Draft Articles as
"guidance" for bilateral or regional agreements, but did not move
forward with a convention. 57 Nonetheless, the creation and continued

50.
UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(a).
51.
See Draft Articles, supranote 12, at 1-2.
52.
Id. arts. 4-7.
53.
Id. art. 3.
54.
See Chusei Yamada, Codification of the Law of Transboundary Aquifers
(Groundwaters) by the United Nations, 36 WATER INT'L 557, 562 (2011) ("[Elach state
has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer located within its
territory.").
55.
U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., Sixth Comm., 16th mtg. at 2-8, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/66/SR.16 (Feb. 14, 2012); U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., Sixth Comm., 29th mtg. at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.29 (Feb. 7, 2012).
56.
General Assembly of the United Nations Legal-Sixth Committee, SixtySixth Session Summary of Work, http://www.un.org/en/galsixth/66/TransAquifer.html
[http://perma.cc/TW8U-J2D5] (archived Oct. 2, 2014) (noting that the sixth committee
encouraged the "International Hydrological programme of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ... to offer further scientific and
technical assistance to the States Concerned.").
57.
See U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 68th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.68
(Dec. 16, 2013).
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development of the Draft Articles represents the third major legal
instrument attempting to govern transboundary water resources.
The corpus of international water law can therefore be
summarized as a progressive set of codified customary rules on the
one hand, and a group of uncoordinated treaties in various stages of
development on the other. The ILA's attempts to develop the field of
international water law by codifying customary rules and norms are
noteworthy in that the 1966 Helsinki Rules set in motion the
conceptualization and development of international water law. The
2004 Berlin Rules, on the other hand, attempted to reinvigorate the
field in the wake of the Watercourses Convention's slow progress by
articulating the foundational principles of international water law in
a way that acknowledges the tensions between them. Less
encouraging is the status of the three treaties attempting to create a
binding framework for water resources management: the UNECE
Water Convention, the Draft Articles, and the Watercourses
Convention. The UNECE Water Convention has, entered into force
and is binding on member parties; its focus and guiding philosophy is
one of impact mitigation and conservation. The Draft Articles is the
least developed. It notably governs all groundwater, but introduces
the principle of territorial sovereignty to a legal field in which that
principle had not emerged. The treaty with the most promise as an
international water agreement remains the Watercourses
Convention. It creates a framework for cooperation by recognizing the
principles of equitable use and no significant harm, while calling on
states to balance those principles in their own site-specific
agreements. While it enjoyed overwhelming initial support, the
Watercourses Convention took seventeen years to enter into force
after its adoption in the General Assembly. With its newfound status
as a binding treaty, the Watercourses Convention is in a critical
position. As a binding treaty, the limitations of the Watercourses
Convention must be recognized.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION

On the dawn of entry into force, it is imperative that the
international community understands the Watercourses Convention's
limitations. Namely: (1) despite entry into force, there remains a
troubling lack of support for, and pace of, state ratifications of the
Watercourses Convention; (2) parallel treaty instruments with
overlapping mandates compete for their position in, and potentially
confuse, contemporary understandings of international water law;
and (3) inherent tensions between the foundational principles of
equitable use and no significant harm are unable to provide
meaningful guidance to states in protracted conflicts over water
resources.
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A. Lack of Support from UN Member States
Ratifications of the Watercourses Convention have been trickling
in for seventeen years, with the current total falling far short of the
106 states voting in favor of the Watercourses Convention in 1997.58
While entry into force of a broad and consequential international
treaty like the Watercourses Convention may require a certain grace
period to allow states to accede, at some point the grace period
expires, and the lack of contracting states raises questions about the
enduring validity of the Watercourses Convention's initially broad
support. In the aggregate, the lack of contracting parties might
represent a rejection of the substantive principles and signal that
customary international water law is not settled. Individually, the
discrepancy between the 1997 vote and the number of member
parties today suggests that some states may have changed positions,
or that their initial support was strong enough to vote in favor of
adopting the Watercourses Convention, but not strong enough to
ratify it. On the other hand, the slow pace of ratifications could be
due to other factors independent of the substantive provisions of the
Watercourses Convention that are frustrating efforts to obtain
widespread acceptance. It is conceivable that all of the above
viewpoints are a contributing factor limiting the impact of the
Watercourses Convention.
It is certainly not a resounding endorsement of the Watercourses
Convention's role as a codification of customary international water
law that only thirty-five states have acceded to the Watercourses
Convention over a seventeen-year period. This is especially true since
the Watercourses Convention is a framework treaty, modestly
intending to articulate understandings of international water law in a
way that enables states to apply the law on a case-by-case basis
according to the characteristics of their watercourse.5 9 An absence of
ratifications may suggest that states disagree with the Watercourses
Convention's interpretations of international water law 60 or, if the

58.
Compare Status of Watercourses Convention, supra note 6 (showing 35
countries to ratify, accept, approve, or accede the UN Watercourses Convention), with
LOURES, LAURE-VERCAMBRE & RIEU-CLARKE, supra note 25 (explaining the official vote
count in favor of the UN Watercourses Convention).
59.
See McCaffrey, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, supra note 24, at 1 ("It is a framework convention, in the
sense that it provides a framework of principles and rules that may be applied and
adjusted to suit the characteristics of particular international watercourses.").
60.
Even at the time of adoption, the extent to which the UN Watercourses
Convention accurately reflected customary international water law was a matter of
some debate. See, e.g., Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Convention on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 501, 503 (1997)
(remarking that states party to existing watercourse treaties "felt threatened by the
new Convention as constituting a potential danger to existing agreements"); Reaz
Rahman, The Law of International Uses of International Watercourses: Dilemma for
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Watercourses Convention's interpretations are considered accurate,
that the field of international water law is not yet appropriately
settled.
The Berlin Rules suggest that both may be true. The Berlin
Rules contributed several layers to the development of international
Convention's
water law, implying that the Watercourses
interpretation of customary international water law is, at a
minimum, incomplete. First, the Berlin Rules extended the
applicability of international water laws to waters that were purely
national. 61 The right of public participation, the obligation to use best
efforts to achieve both conjunctive and integrated management of
waters, and duties to achieve sustainability and the minimization of
environmental harm are principles either new or modified vis-a-vis
the Watercourses Convention. 62 Second, the Berlin Rules articulate
customary international law applicable to groundwater. The
Watercourses Convention, while including in its definition of
"watercourse" groundwater connected to surface water, excluded
confined aquifers from its coverage. Bisecting groundwater in this
manner is problematic, in part because an overwhelming majority of
the earth's available freshwater is located in aquifers. 63 The Berlin
Rules include both confined and unconfined aquifers in its definition
of "waters," and elucidate principles applicable to both national and
international aquifers. As the Berlin Rules are an attempted
expression of customary international law, the variations between the
principles in the Berlin Rules and those of the Watercourses
Convention necessitate that at least one interpretation is inaccurate.
Based on the statements made during the discussion of the
Watercourses Convention before the General Assembly, there are at
least some states 64 that believe the text of the Watercourses

Lower Riparians,19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 9 (1995); Attila Tanzi, The UN Convention on
International Water-courses as a Framework for the Avoidance and Settlement of
Waterlaw Disputes, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 441 (1998).
See Joseph W Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules on Water Resources: The New
61.
Paradigmfor InternationalWater Law, Address Before the World Environmental and
Water Resource Congress (May 21-25, 2006), in WORLD ENVIRONMENTAL AND WATER
RESOURCE CONGRESS 2006 at 6 ("The Berlin Rules include within their scope both
national and international waters to the extent that customary international law
speaks to those waters.").
See id. at 6-7.
62.
United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, Facts and Figures:
63.
Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk, WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 4,
87 (noting that estimates of the global volume of stored groundwater range from 15.3 to
60 million km3).
Turkey, Pakistan, Spain, and China have made such statements. China, for
64.
example, believes that territorial sovereignty is a basic principle of international water
law. "A watercourse State enjoys indisputable territorial sovereignty over those parts
of international watercourses that flow through its territory. It is incomprehensible
and regrettable that the draft Convention does not affirm this principle." U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99 (May 21, 1997).
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Convention does not accurately reflect customary international water
law. 65
A second explanation for the lack of ratifications to date is the
possibility that initial support-as evidenced by the 106 countries
voting in favor of the Watercourses Convention-was not as strong as
it appeared. That appeared to be France's concern in 1997. French
delegates observed a lack of meaningful engagement from UN
member states during negotiations, hastily conducted debates, and a
general indifference to a process that could produce a consensus
agreement. 66 If those observations were correct, then it would help
explain the high level of support for the Watercourses Convention
when that support was relatively non-committal, compared to the low
number of states willing to legally bind themselves to it. Initial
support may also have been illusory due to the evolving positions
taken by states. As domestic politics evolve, decision-makers with
their own views on matters of foreign policy come and go. Support for
the Watercourses Convention from one administration can be
followed by a lack of support from the next. Similarly, for some states
the procedural mechanism required to sign a treaty may be different
from the one required to ratify it. The United States, for example,
famously signed the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change at the direction of the President, but could not ratify
the treaty without the consent of the US Senate. 67
Finally, low levels of ratification from UN member states may
have more to do with context than the substantive provisions of the
Watercourses Convention itself. As mentioned, the 1990s ushered in
a multitude of international environmental agreements, and some
states may not have been well equipped to critically evaluate their
positions on so many issues or marshal each treaty through the

65.
If the UN Watercourses Convention does accurately interpret customary
international water law, it is possible that lack of support for the Convention is a
critique not of the Convention's articulation of customary law, but of the principles
themselves. Under this view, either international water law is insufficiently developed,
and therefore not ripe for a binding treaty, or international law is not an appropriate
mechanism to manage transboundary water resources in the first place. Since water
resources do not respect political boundaries and often pose challenges of an
international nature, the notion that international law should not be used to facilitate
cooperation has thus far not been a prominent view. Whether or not international
water law is adequately developed and ripe for a treaty, however, is further explored
below.
66.
See U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., supra note 64, at 8 (stating
that France abstained from voting to adopt the Convention because it was "[n]egotiated
in haste, it [was] carelessly drafted and imbued with a spirit of partisanship").
67.
See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (as passed by Senate, July 25, 1997), which
indicates that the Senate did not consent to the accession of the Kyoto Protocol. United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, https://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocollstatus of_ratification/items/2613.php [http://
perma.cc/7UU4-9W4C] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
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ratification process. 68 Accordingly, the attention paid by the
international community to climate change and biodiversity may
have come at the cost of ignoring international water issues. Along
the same lines, states-especially those in the developing world-may
not have been aware of the Watercourses Convention, or capable of
appreciating the ramifications of its provisions. 6 9 If that were the
case, delaying ratification would surely be the appropriate response.
Ultimately, each state has its own reasons for not ratifying the
Watercourses Convention. Whether because of disagreement with the
substantive provisions of the treaty, a change in positions, treaty
congestion, or lack of capacity, it is clear that the Watercourses
Convention does not enjoy broad support, or sufficient attention, from
the international community. The fact that the Watercourses
Convention entered into force seventeen years after its adoption in
the General Assembly suggests that the Watercourses Convention
does not create a framework agreement articulating broadly accepted
notions of customary international water law. A renewed
commitment could change that, of course, and the pace of ratifications
in recent years has increased significantly. 70 It is possible that since
the Watercourses Convention is now in force, the momentum
generated will usher in a number of member parties wishing to be
part of the latest international agreement. Nonetheless, the
legitimacy of international law is derived from its acceptance by
international actors, and the low levels of support the Watercourses
Convention receives from UN member states is a significant
limitation on the Watercourses Convention's ability to contribute to,
much less guide, the development of international water law.
B. Competing Treaty Regimes

An unfortunate characteristic of international law is the
relatively unstructured nature of lawmaking, which occasionally
leads to uncoordinated or inconsistent development of treaty regimes.
Such is the case for international water law, 71 where the

See Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supranote 10, at 192-193 (describing the effects
68.
of "treaty congestion," and suggesting that "[a] country needs sufficient political,
administrative, and economic capacity to be able to implement agreements
effectively").
See id. at 193 ("Another reason why the UN Watercourses Convention has
69.
not been widely ratified may relate to lack of awareness and capacity.").
70.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14 (showing sixteen of the
thirty-four member parties of the UN Watercourses Convention have ratified since
2010).
71.
See Ryan B. Stoa, Harmonizing International Water Law: Current
Challenges And Future Prospects, 2 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 533, 540 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2417031 [http://perma.cc/Y2GF-PT83] (archived Sept. 14,
2014) (discussing the uncoordinated nature of international water laws).
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Watercourses Convention exists alongside the UNECE Water
Convention and the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers, among other legal instruments. The three instruments were
not developed as a complementary package, but rather to address the
needs perceived by constituent member states and their institutional
objectives. Inevitably, perhaps, their substantive provisions are not
harmonious, and create a competition for primacy and acceptance in
the international arena.
The UNECE Water Convention is the most direct challenge to
the Watercourses Convention's perch atop the international water
law landscape. It is nearly identical in scope and subject matter,
while distinguishing itself through an eighteen-year history of
binding legal status. As an institution, the UNECE is the largest
regional commission of the United Nations, 72 and claims 20 percent of
the global human population. 7 Its geographic scope is also not
limited to developed European states. The United States, Canada,
Russia, Israel, and the Central Asian republics and former Soviet bloc
are member states. 74 Having entered into force in 1996, the UNECE
Water Convention has had time to develop hard law instruments
such as the Protocol on Water and Health7 5 and the Protocol on Civil
Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary
Waters.7 6 Guidance documents have been produced on topics such as
climate change adaptation,7 7 water management in extreme weather
events, 7 payment for ecosystem services, 7 flood protection, 80

72.
The UNECE has 56 member states. U.N. EcON. COMM'N FOR EUROPE,
Member States and Member States Representatives (Aug. 22, 2014), http://
www.unece.orgloes/nutshell/memberStatesrepresentatives.html [http://perma.cclH2D9QQS] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) [hereinafter UNECE Member States].
73.
U.N.
EcoN.
COMM'N
FOR
EUROPE,
Geographical
Scope,
http://www.unece.org/oes/nutshell/region.html [http://perma.cc/WL94-FDUD] (archived
Sept. 21, 2014).
UNECE Member States, supra note 72.
74.
75.
Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, June 17, 1999, 2331
U.N.T.S. 202.
76.
Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 1992
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents, May 21, 2003, U.N. Doc. ECEIMP.WAT/11-ECE/CP.TEIA/9.
77.
See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Guidance on Water and Adaptation to
Climate Change (Oct. 2009), http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=11658
[http://
perma.cc/3CFZ-CMT7] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing the effects of climate
change on the world's water resources).
78.
See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Guidance on Water Supply and
Sanitation in Extreme Weather Events (Nov. 2011), http://www.unece.org/
index.php?id=29338 [http://perma.cc/W7K6-2ECA] (archived Sept. 14, 2014)
(discussing actions that may be taken to protect water supplies in the face of extreme
weather events).
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groundwater management, 8 and implementation of the UNECE
Water Convention itself 82 Funding is provided to assist member
states with their technical capacities to implement the UNECE Water
Convention and cooperate with co-riparians,83 and a multitude of
UNECE Water Convention Bodies have been set up to strengthen
organizational support structures.8 4 The UNECE Water Convention
is both legally binding and institutionally developed, and will likely
remain so for the foreseeable future. It is an international water law
regime with which the Watercourses Convention must reconcile.

79.
See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Recommendations on Payments for
Ecosystem Services in Integrated Water Resources Management (Aug. 2007),
http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=11663 [http://perma.cc/BQD-6VEF] (archived Sept.
14, 2014) (outlining how to improve protection of valuable ecosystems).
80.
See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Guidelines on Sustainable Flood
Prevention (Jan. 2000), http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=12617 [http://perma.cc/AL742MVV] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (outlining actions countries can take to prevent
catastrophic flooding events).
81.
See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Model Provisions on Transboundary
Groundwaters (Feb. 2014), http://www.unece.org/env/water/publications/ece-mp.wat
40.html [http://perma.cc4MZ7-5F78] (archived Sept. 21, 2014) (discussing the need
for cooperation in managing transboundary groundwaters).
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Meeting of the
82.
Parties to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, Integrated Management of Water and Related Ecosystems:
Draft Guide to Implementing The Convention, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/2009/L.2 (Nov.
10-12, 2009) (discussing implementation strategies).
83.
See, e.g., U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Projects in Central Asia, http://
(archived
[http://perma.cc/SVV4-NT2X]
www.unece.org/env/water/centralasia.html
Sept. 14, 2014) (outlining assistance available for Central Asia); U.N. Econ. Comm'n for
Europe, Projects in the Caucasus, http://www.unece.org/env/water/caucasus.html
[http://perma.cc/C6HY-E8H9] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (outlining projects between
Georgia and Azerbaijan); U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Projects in Eastern Europe,
(archived
[http://perma.cc/R22L-892Y]
http://www.unece.org/env/water/eeurope.html
Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing the Dniester River project); U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe,
Projects in South-Eastern Europe, http://www.unece.org/env/water/seeurope.html
[http://perma.cc/5TP3-GZDG] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing the Drin River
Basin project).
84.
See, e.g., U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Meeting of the Parties,
http://www.unece.org/env/water/meetings/convention.meeting.html [http://perma.cc/4J3RKQ7N] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("The Meeting of the Parties is the main governing
body of the Convention."); U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Bureau, http://
www.unece.org/env/water/conventionbureau.html [http://perma.cc/EL79-99UU] (archived
Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing the structure of the Bureau of the Meeting of the Parties);
U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, International Water Assessment Center,
[http://perma.cc/KWQ7-HHV4]
http://www.unece.org/env/water/services/serv_1.html
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("The International Water Assessment Centre (IWAC) was
established as a collaborative centre of the Convention"); U.N. Econ. Comm'n for
Europe, Legal Board, http/www.unece.org/env/water/meetings/legaLboard/legalboard.html
[http://perma.cc/JH7B-HNPM] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing the purpose of the
legal board in handling legal questions derived from the Convention); U.N. Econ.
Comm'n for Europe, Implementation Committee, http://www.unece.org/env/water/
implementation committee.html [http://perma.cc/UYL3-BKJF] (archived Sept. 14,
2014) (explaining the Committee's duties in overseeing the implementation of the
Convention).
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When the UNECE Water Convention was adopted in 1992 and
entered into force in 1996,85 it was not global in scope. Article 23
limited participation to UNECE member states, states with
consultative status, and regional economic integration organizations
constituting UNECE member states. 86 Nonetheless, the challenges
the UNECE Water Convention set out to address, and the goals it
sought to achieve, were nearly identical to those of the Watercourses
Convention. Both treaties recognized
the importance of
transboundary water resources,8 7 the need to abate pollution, 8 and
the role of the treaty in the development of international water law,89
while framing the document as a framework agreement facilitating
bilateral and multilateral watercourse agreements.9 0 There wereand there continue to be-substantive differences in the approach to
achieving these goals, but the subject matter objective of promoting
international cooperation over water resources by developing legal
principles is essentially the same.
As mentioned above, the geographic scope and inclusiveness of
the UNECE region is sufficiently broad that implementation of the
UNECE Water Convention and the Watercourses Convention would
require some harmonizing of principles or legal interpretation even if
the UNECE Water Convention had remained a strictly regional
treaty. The 2003 UNECE Water Convention Amendments, however,
entered into force in 2013,91 extending the potential jurisdiction of the
treaty to all international waters by allowing any UN member state
to accede to the UNECE Water Convention (pending ratification of

85.
The UNECE Water Convention was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on March
17, 1992, and entered into force on October 6, 1996. It has been ratified by 38 UNECE
member states and the European Union. UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11.
86.
Id. art. 23.
87.
See id. pmbl. ("Mindful that the protection and use of transboundary
watercourses and international lakes are important and urgent tasks."); see also UN
Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. ("Conscious of the importance of
international watercourses and the non-navigational uses thereof in many regions of
the world.").
88.
See UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, pmbl.; UN Watercourses
Convention, supra note 14, pmbl.
89.
See UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, pmbl. ("Conscious of the role
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in promoting international
cooperation for the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary water pollution
and sustainable use of transboundary waters."); UN Watercourses Convention, supra
note 14, pmbl. ("Considering that successful codification and progressive development
of rules of international law regarding non-navigational uses of international
watercourses would assist in promoting and implementing the purposes and principles
set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.").
90.
See UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, pmbl.; UN Watercourses
Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. ("Recalling also the existing bilateral and
multilateral agreements regarding the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses.").
Amendments to Articles 25 and 26 of the UNECE Convention, supra note
91.
47.
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the amendment by all 2003 parties to the UNECE Water
Convention). 92 The 2003 amendments create a mandate for global
applicability, and may signal that the UNECE community intends to
promote the UNECE Water Convention as the leading instrument of
international water law.9 3
From the perspective of legal compliance, entry into force of the
Watercourses Convention should not be unduly problematic for states
party to both conventions, but the precise interaction between the
treaties appears ambiguous. Article 3(1) of the Watercourses
Convention makes clear that it should not be construed to supersede,
constrain, or otherwise conflict with existing agreements in force at
94
the time a state becomes party to the Watercourses Convention.
Having entered into force in 1996, the UNECE Water Convention
would qualify as an existing agreement for any state that ratified it
prior to becoming a member party of the Watercourses Convention.
Even if a state ratified the UNECE Water Convention after becoming
a member party of the Watercourses Convention, Article 3(3) allows
subsequent watercourse agreements to modify or adjust the
provisions of the Watercourses Convention to the particular
characteristics of the watercourse governed by the watercourse
agreement in question.95
The permissiveness of Article 3(3) should allow the UNECE
Water Convention-and its amendments-to co-exist with the UN
Watercourses Convention as far as the Watercourses Convention is
concerned, as long as the UNECE Water Convention qualifies as a
"watercourse agreement." That distinction is less clear. When
permitting watercourse agreements to modify the Watercourses
Convention's principles, Articles 3(3)-(6) make repeated references to
"particular" international watercourses. Article 3(4), for example,
stipulates that watercourse agreements must define the waters to

Id. art. 25(3). Article 25 of the amended text now reads: "Any other State
92.
not referred to in paragraph 2, that is a Member of the United Nations may accede to
the Convention upon approval by the Meeting of the Parties." The introductory note to
the amended UNECE Water Convention adds that in 2012 the Meeting of the Parties
clarified that any future request for accession by non-UNECE states would be
considered approved by the Meeting of the Parties. Id. at 3.
Id. at 4. Decision VI/3 allowing accession to the UNECE Water Convention
93.
by non-UNECE states expands on the 1992 Preamble by stating that the Meeting of
the Parties confirm "the conviction that the Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes is an effective instrument to
support cooperation also beyond the region of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE)," and express their intent "to collectively promote river
basin cooperation throughout the world, including by offering a global
intergovernmental platform for exchange and debate on transboundary water issues
and for supporting the implementation of international water law."
UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 3(1)-(2). Pursuant to
94.
Article 3(2), parties to such agreements are invited to consider harmonizing their
agreement with the principles of the UN Convention.
See id. art. 3(3).
95.
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which they apply, the acceptable scope being "an entire international
watercourse or any part thereof or a particular project, programme or
use." 96 The UNECE Water Convention does not define the waters to
which it applies-being a framework treaty-other than a broad
definition of "transboundary waters."97 All transboundary waters in
the territorial jurisdiction of UNECE Water Convention member
states are subject to the UNECE Water Convention, but it is not clear
if that is particular enough to qualify the UNECE Water Convention
as a "watercourse agreement" under Article 3 of the Watercourses
Convention. Most likely the Watercourses Convention did not
envision needing to address a second global framework agreement on
transboundary watercourses.9 8
For its part, the UNECE Water Convention is not as
accommodating to current and future watercourse agreements.
Article 9(1) requires that states enter into bilateral or multilateral
agreements that conform to the principles of the UNECE Water
Convention, or adapt existing ones "where necessary to eliminate the
contradictions with the basic principles of this Convention."" Again,
however, references to particular watercourse agreements suggest
that, like the Watercourses Convention, the UNECE Water
Convention was created to promote cooperation and development of
site-specific agreements.1 00 It is not clear how the UNECE Water
Convention expects to interact with the Watercourses Convention.'o
Naturally, the supremacy of the conventions relative to each
other only matters in practice if (1) their provisions overlap, and (2)
their provisions are contradictory. Unfortunately, it appears both are
the case. Both texts claim jurisdictional authority over transboundary
waters. 102 At the same time, the conventions have overlapping

Id. art. 3(4).
96.
97.
UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(1).
98.
See U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., supra note 64, at 2. The
Meeting Notes for the adoption of the UN Watercourses Convention in 1997 made no
mention of the UNECE Water Convention (in force at the time), while the Mexican
delegation introduced the resolution by stating that the Convention "undoubtedly
marks an important step in the progressive development and codification of
international law, the promotion of which is a fundamental responsibility of this
Assembly." Id.
99.
UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, art. 9(1).
100.
See, e.g., id. art. 9(2) (discussing the establishment of joint bodies and their
duties).
101.
See Amendments to Articles 25 and 26 of the UNECE Convention, supra
note 47 (showing that any mention of the UN Watercourses Convention is
conspicuously absent from Decision VI/3 amending the UNECE Water Convention in
2003).
102.
See UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 1 (discussing how
the convention applies to international watercourses); UN Watercourses Convention,
supra note 14, art. 1 (stating the Convention applies to international watercourses).
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1 03
pollution control, 104 information
provisions on guiding principles,
exchange, notification, consultation, 105 and dispute settlement, 106
among others. A cursory review of those provisions reveals several
contradictions. For example, the Watercourses Convention allows for
unilateral submission of a dispute to a fact-finding commission if
10
other dispute settlement measures are unsuccessful.o The UNECE
Water Convention, on the other hand, requires that the mechanism
108
The Watercourses
for dispute settlement be mutually acceptable.
pollution, 0 9 while
control
to
cooperation
demands
merely
Convention
the UNECE Water Convention requires specific pollution control
measures be adopted, such as pollutant discharge limits, permit
programs, and environmental impact assessments. 1 0 Most strikingly,
the guiding principles of the conventions are not congruent. The
Watercourses Convention's primary guiding principles are the right
of equitable use, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the
obligation to cooperate."' The principle of cooperation is prevalent
throughout the UNECE Water Convention, 112 but the pervasive
theme of the UNECE Water Convention is impact mitigation, not
use.1 13 Accordingly, many of its provisions are more targeted and
require proactive engagement from member states.
Evidently many states are not overly concerned with the overlap
and conflict between the two treaties. Of the thirty-five member
parties to the UN Watercourses Convention, fifteen are also member
11 4
Implied is that states
parties of the UNECE Water Convention.
or conflicting
overlap
jurisdictional
a
perceive
not
may either
by some other
outweighed
are
concerns
those
do,
they
if
or,
provisions
over water
cooperation
promote
to
desire
general
a
as
factor, such
that the
effect
the
case,
any
In
possible.
as
fora
many
as
in
resources
is
Convention
Watercourses
the
on
has
Convention
Water
UNECE

UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, art. 2; UN Watercourses
103.
Convention, supranote 14, pt. II.
UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, art. 3; UN Watercourses
104.
Convention, supra note 14, art. 21.
UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, arts. 6, 10, 13; UN Watercourses
105.
Convention, supra note 14, pt. III.
UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, art. 22; UN Watercourses
106.
Convention, supra note 14, art. 33.
UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 33(3).
107.
See UNECE Water Convention, supranote 12, art. 22(1).
108.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 21(2).
109.
See UNECE Water Convention, supranote 12, art. 3.
110.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, arts. 5, 7, 8.
111.
See UNECE Water Convention supra note 11, arts. 2(6), 9 (showing efforts
112.
to encourage cooperation).
See id. art. 2(1) (providing that "[t]he Parties shall take all appropriate
113.
measures to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary impact.").
114.
Those states are: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and Uzbekistan.
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broader than a consideration of overlapping and conflicting
provisions. Perhaps more important is the competition created by two
framework water treaties in a climate where attention paid-and
political capital given-to international environmental agreements is
already scarce. There are 193 UN member states, and with thirty-five
and thirty-nine member parties, respectively, the Watercourses
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention have a long way to go
before either treaty represents the majority, much less a consensus,
of member states. Understanding the challenge, major international
organizations are lining up to support their preferred treaty through
advocacy campaigns and donor-funded projects." 8 While the spirit
and intent behind those ratification efforts are likely harmonious,
and some organizations are actively working to harmonize the
treaties, there is little doubt that either treaty would receive more
attention from the rest of the international community if it were
alone in providing a framework for transboundary water cooperation.
At this point it is not clear which treaty regime will emerge supreme,
but it likely does not bode well for the Watercourses Convention that
the UNECE Water Convention is firmly entrenched as a second
framework instrument of international water law.
The second treaty regime in competition with the Watercourses
Convention is the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers. The Draft Articles were developed partly as a response to
slow progress in ratifying the Watercourses Convention, partly
because the Watercourses Convention's jurisdictional scope excludes
confined aquifers, and partly because the international community
has only recently understood the extent of, and reliance on,
groundwater withdrawals.11 6 Like the UNECE Water Convention,
however, the jurisdictional scope of the Draft Articles overlaps with
that of the Watercourses Convention, and the overlap implicates
provisions that are at odds with each other.

115.
The World Wildlife Fund for Nature, for example, is championing the UN
Watercourses Convention, while the UNECE is partnering with the European Union
and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to promote the
UNECE Water Convention. While these and other organizations are keenly aware of
the parallel legal regimes, and in many cases are actively engaged on the issue, the
promotion of one treaty will not always synergistically promote the other. See generally
UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14 (guiding signatories on how to undertake
transboundary watercourse management); WWF GLOBAL, http://wwf.panda.org/
whatwedo/howwe..work/policy/conventions/water conventions/un watercourses -con
vention/ [http://perma.cc/4F7V-2W5L] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (supporting the UN
Watercourses Convention); U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, About the National Policy
Dialogues, http://www.unece.org/env/water/npd.html [http://perma.cc/RPX5-SAVW]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing different organizations that support the UNECE
Water Convention).
116.
Yamada, supra note 54, at 558-59 (noting that 97% of available freshwater
is located in aquifers and that groundwater is the single most extracted raw material
in the world).
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The Watercourses Convention applies to surface and
groundwater systems "constituting by virtue of their physical
relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common
terminus."11 7 While this definition includes most freshwater on earth,
it notably excludes groundwater that is not hydrologically connected
to surface water, otherwise known as confined aquifers. 118 The
exclusion provided the ILC an opportunity to develop laws for
confined aquifer management that were not articulated in the
Watercourses Convention. At some point, however, the scope of the
task was broadened to include all aquifers. 119 Accordingly, the Draft
Articles and the Watercourses Convention both apply jurisdiction to
mentioned, constitute the
unconfined groundwater systems, which, as2012
majority of available freshwater on earth.1 1
Overlapping subject matter is only a problem for the
Watercourses Convention if the provisions governing groundwater
are incompatible with each other. That appears to be the case in a
significant way. The first general principle of the Draft Articles is the
sovereignty of aquifer states: "Each aquifer State has sovereignty
over the portion of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located
within its territory. It shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance
with international law and the present articles."122 The sovereignty
principle is not contained in the Helsinki Rules, the UNECE Water
Convention, the Watercourses Convention, or the Berlin Rules, and
may reverse over 100 years of development in the field of
international water law. 128 The Special Rapporteur to the ILC
responsible for formulating the Draft Articles insisted at the time
that the sovereignty clause was necessary to obtain the support of
member states that view aquifers similarly to mineral resources

UN Watercourses Convention, supranote 14, art. 2(a).
117.
See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The InternationalLaw Commission's Flawed
118.
Draft Articles on the Law of TransboundaryAquifers: the way forward, 36 WATER INT'L
566, 567 (2011) [hereinafter Flawed Draft Articles]; and McCaffrey, Convention on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, supra note 24.
Compare McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 566-69, with Yamada, supra note
119.
54, at 558-59 (presenting opposing views on whether this was the intention).
See Yamada, supra note 54, at 558-59 (discussing how the Draft Articles
120.
target groundwater).
121.
In considering the definitions of "groundwater" and "aquifer," a distinction,
which the Draft Articles do not appear to draw, can be made between the geologic
formation that contains water (aquifer), and the water itself (groundwater). See
generally Christine Traversi, The Inadequacies of the 1997 Convention on International
Watercourses and 2008 Draft Articles on the Law of TransboundaryAquifers, 33 HOus.
J. INT'L L. 453 (2011).
Draft Articles, supra note 12, art. 3.
122.
See McCaffrey, Flawed Draft Articles, supra note 118, at 570 (discussing
123.
the action of US Attorney General Judson Harmon who, in response to claims over the
Rio Grande by Mexico, asserted the absolute sovereignty of every nation within its own
territory).
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governed by the sovereignty principle. 124 China, for example, was
beating the drum of territorial sovereignty over water resources as
early as 1997 when it voted against the Watercourses Convention. 125
Proponents of the principle point to the second sentence of the
sovereignty clause-which states that sovereignty will be exercised in
accordance with international law-as cause for restraint, but
introducing sovereignty into the Law of Transboundary Aquifers
reshapes international law on this issue and creates a tripod of
interpretational conflict between the principles of sovereignty,
equitable use, and no significant harm. 126
Unlike the UNECE Water Convention, incompatible substantive
provisions with the Draft Articles are problematic for the
Watercourses Convention because if the Draft Articles enter into
force, they will have done so after the Watercourses Convention. If
that were the case, Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties-which states that parties to two treaties with
incompatible provisions must follow the provisions of the later
treaty-would hold that the Draft Articles supersede the
Watercourses Convention with respect to any contradictory
provisions.' 2 7 Not only does that not bode well for the credibility and
institutional integrity of the Watercourses Convention, it also creates
a degree of uncertainty for states trying to anticipate future water
rights.
Fortunately for the Watercourses Convention, the Draft Articles
are much further behind on the path to binding treaty status, and
appear to lack a critical mass of support needed to move forward with
a convention. The United Nations' Sixth Legal Committee met in
October and November of 2011 to discuss the potential for a
convention on the Draft Articles. States expressed a number of
reservations, among them the need to study state practice, clarify
terms, focus on water quality, distinguish between arid and non-arid
regions, and address conflict states. 128 Subsequently, the General

124.
See Yamada, supra note 54, at 562 (explaining the decision calculus of the
Special Rapporteur).
125.
See U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., supra note 64, at 6 ("A
watercourse State enjoys indisputable territorial sovereignty over those parts of
international watercourses that flow through its territory.").
126.
See Draft Articles, supra note 12, art. 3. An original author of the
Watercourses Convention has expressed concern that the sovereignty clause of the
Draft Articles would require a "fundamental re-thinking" of how basic principles of the
Watercourses Convention would be applied. See McCaffrey, Flawed Draft Articles,
supra note 118, at 568.
127.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(3), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (explaining the procedure for dealing with contradictory subsequent
agreements).
128.
See U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., Sixth Comm., 16th mtg., supra note 55
(discussing committee disagreements).
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Assembly adopted resolution 66/104 in December 2011 129 and
resolution 68/118 in December 2013,130 both of which note the value
of the Draft Articles as guidelines, encouraging states to take them
into account when making regional or bilateral arrangements, but do
not call for a convention to codify the Law of Transboundary Aquifers.
While it takes time for customary principles to become binding
law, it is not clear how, when, or if, the Draft Articles will become
part of the greater international water law regime. There is evidence
that the Draft Articles are providing a framework for regional
groundwater agreements,11 but at this point entry into force of the
Law of Transboundary Aquifers seems remote. Nonetheless, overlaps
and conflicts between the Draft Articles and the Watercourses
Convention create a dilemma for states forced to invoke or promote
the advancement of one instrument at the expense of the other. In
particular, the sovereignty principle introduced to the field of
international water law by the Draft Articles may serve as
ammunition for states seeking to undercut the Watercourses
Convention's obligation not to cause significant harm. At the very
least, the Draft Articles represent a second treaty regime with
overlapping jurisdictional subject matter and conflicting provisions, a
development which makes it less likely that states consider the
Watercourses Convention the definitive expression of international
water law, and accordingly, a treaty worth acceding to.
C. Principlesin Tension
The third major limitation of the Watercourses Convention is the
fact that its foundational principles-the right of equitable use and
the obligation not to cause significant harm-are in tension with each
other, and the relationship between them is ambiguous. The right to
an equitable and reasonable utilization of a watercourse grants states
the authority to make reasonable use of water resources while taking
into account the correlative rights of other watercourse states, as well
as the long-term sustainability of the resource. 132 It was first
33
articulated as a customary international law in the Helsinki Rules,
though various forms of the right to use water resources to fulfill

Shared natural resources (Law of transboundary aquifers): I General
129.
Assembly Action, INT'L LAW COMM'N, http://Iegal.un.org/ilc/guide/8_-.5.htm (last updated
Feb. 7, 2012) [http://perma.cclX2BW-K76V] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
See U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 68th plen. mtg., supra note 57, at 7.
130.
See, e.g., Pilar C. Villar & Wagner C. Ribeiro, The Agreement on the
131.
GuaraniAquifer: A New Paradigmfor TransboundaryGroundwater Management?, 36
WATER INT'L 646 (2011).
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(1).
132.
See Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, art. 4 (establishing the right to an
133.
equitable use of water resources).
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basic human needs have been in place for centuries.1 34 State practice
supports the principle as well. A 1994 report of the ILC found
overwhelming evidence that equitable use is a general and widely
accepted principle of water management.' 3 5 There is little question
that the right to equitable use of a watercourse is an established
principle of customary international water law.
The obligation not to cause significant harm, on the other hand,
is not as definitive. On its face it requires states to refrain from
taking actions that cause significant harm to a watercourse or
watercourse state. As applied, however, it can be interpreted to
preclude actions that would otherwise be considered reasonable (e.g.,
municipal water supply) on the basis that significant harm is
incurred by a co-riparian watercourse state. The Watercourses
Convention attempts to balance that obligation with the right of
equitable use by requiring that states take appropriate measures to
prevent, mitigate, or compensate for significant harm incurred, 18 6
with due regard for the right of equitable use.1 37 While there is
historical support for the obligation, 138 its standing as a coequal
principle with the right of equitable use was introduced by the
Watercourses Convention.'3 9 The Helsinki Rules did not elevate the
concept of no significant harm to a stand-alone principle, for example.
Instead, the protection was included as an enumerated factor to
consider when determining the extent to which a use is equitable.140
This provision may have been the seed that would grow to become the
principle of no significant harm, but the obligation was ultimately a
product of negotiations of the Watercourses Convention.141 It is easy

134.
See Salzman, supra note 15, at 98-103 (exploring the history of water use
rights).
135.
See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fortysixth session, supra note 19, at 98 ("[T]here is overwhelming support for the doctrine of
equitable utilization as a general rule of law for the determination of the rights and
obligations of States in this field.").
136.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(1) (defining the
obligation in Article 7 by stating that "Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an
international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent
the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.").
137.
See id. art. 5(2).
138.
See Salzman, supra note 15, at 101 (explaining that egregious adverse
impacts to water resources could be punishable by death under Australian Aboriginal
water law, for example).
139.
See, e.g., the Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters; Report of the
Sixty-Second Conference, INT'L LAW ASS'N, 251 (1987); Robert D. Hayton & Albert E.
Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 663, 663-76 (1989) (explaining that some form of the obligation not to cause
significant harm may have existed in the customary international law of groundwater
management).
140.
See Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, ch. 2, art. V(II)(11) (discussing the
equitability of water use rights).
141.
See, e.g., Summary Record of the 61st Meeting of the Sixth (Legal)
Committee of the UN General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.

2014]

UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE

1349

to see why: the best interests of downstream watercourse states are
promoted if a robust and enforceable obligation not to cause
downstream harm is imposed on upstream states.
Admittedly, if states applied the principles of equitable use and
no significant harm as intended by the drafters and champions of the
Watercourses Convention, they would operate in fairly elegant
harmony. The principles of equitable use and no significant harm are
broad enough to address the concerns of downstream and upstream
states, and flexible enough to be relevant and applicable in any
transboundary watercourse context.14 2 Similarly, the other provisions
of the treaty-such as the duty to cooperate with co-riparian
watercourse states and the duty to mitigate pollution-are
strategically open-ended in order to maximize broad appeal and
reassure skittish member states that the Watercourses Convention
does not expand or contract rights or duties under customary
international water law because it is a reflection of customary laws
that already exist.148
There are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, the
Watercourses Convention may not be an accurate reflection of rights
and duties under international water law. This would not be
surprising since the field of international water law does not appear
to be definitively settled. The Helsinki Rules, UNECE Water
Convention, Watercourses Convention, Berlin Rules, and Draft
Articles each have a unique formulation of the equitable use/no
significant harm dilemma, among other variations. The Helsinki

A/C.6/51/SR.61 (Apr. 4, 1997); Summary Record of the First Part of the 62d Meeting of
the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the UN General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.62 (Apr. 4, 1997) (discussing the rationale of UN Watercourses
Convention Drafters).
In explaining the interplay between the two principles, Special Rapporteur
142.
to the International Law Commission on the UN Watercourses Convention Stephen
McCaffrey articulated the following:
[I1f a State believes it has sustained significant harm due to a co-riparian
State's use of an international watercourse, it will ordinarily raise the issue
with the second State. In the negotiations that follow, articles 5, 6 and 7 in
effect provide that the objective is to reach a solution that is equitable and
reasonable with regard to both States' uses of the watercourse and the benefits
they derive from it. The possibility that the solution may include the payment
of compensation, to achieve an equitable balance of uses and benefits, is not
excluded.
McCaffrey, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses,supra note 24, at 3.
See Salman M. A. Salman, Misconceptions Regarding the Interpretationof
143.
the UN Watercourses Convention, in THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE:
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 28, 30

(Flavia Rocha, Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013) (explaining the construction of
the UN Watercourses Convention).
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Rules establish the right of equitable use.144 The UNECE Water
Convention emphasizes impact mitigation. 145 The Watercourses
Convention attempts to balance the principles of equitable use and no
significant harm as coequals. 146 The Berlin Rules synthesize the
two. 147 The Draft Articles throw territorial sovereignty into the
mix.148 The differences between these various constructions may be
subtle, but they are meaningful, and illustrate that a consensus
articulation of the rights and duties of watercourse states does not yet
exist.
The question then is whether or not the Watercourses
Convention's formulation of the relationship between equitable use
and no significant harm is the correct interpretation, or at least
sufficiently approximates the correct interpretation such that its
validity endures. Those that believe it does often point to the
International Court of Justice's 1997 judgment in the GabdikovoNagymaros case.149 The Gabeikovo-Nagymaros judgment recognized
the Watercourses Convention as the "modern development of
international law,"150 while citing the principle of equitable use as a
factor in the decision.' 5 ' The case, however, was decided four months
after the Watercourses Convention was adopted,152 when 106 votes in
favor of adoption-not to mention the twenty years of work by the
ILC that culminated in the convention' 5 3-would have been highly

144.
See Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, art. IV ("Each basin State is entitled,
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the
waters of an international drainage basin.").
145.
See UNECE Water Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1) ("The Parties shall
take all appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary
impact.").
146.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, arts. 5-7 (discussing the
value placed on each principle by the Convention).
147.
See Berlin Rules, supra note 37, art. 12 (establishing equitable utilization).
148.
See Draft Articles, supra note 12, art. 3 ("Each aquifer State has
sovereignty over the portion of a Transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located
within its territory. It shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance with international
law and the present draft articles.").
149.
See, e.g., Owen McIntyre & Mara Tignino, Reconciling the UN Watercourses
Convention with Recent Developments in Customary International Law, in THE UN
WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE, supra note 143, at 287; Johan G. Lammers,
Case Analysis: The Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Case Seen in ParticularFrom the Perspective
of the Law of International Watercourses and the Protection of the Environment,
11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 287 (1998).
150.
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 53,
85 (Sept.
25), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf [http://perma.cc/VYZ4F5NG] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
151.
See id. (justifying the principle of equitable use).
152.
The UN Watercourses Convention was adopted on May 21, 1997. The ICJ
rendered its judgment on September 25, 1997.
153.
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT'L LAW (2008),
http/legal.un.org/avl/pdflhalclnuiw/clnuiw-ph~e.pdf [http//perma.cc8H8X-TDLZ] (archived
Sept. 14, 2014) (providing the vote count for the UN Watercourses Convention).
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persuasive. The conspicuous lack of ratifications since the convention
of
was adopted, combined with subsequent developments
international water law (i.e., the Berlin Rules and Draft Articles),
calls into question the contemporary veracity of the ICJ's judgment.
Furthermore, while the judgment cited the Watercourses Convention,
the substantive provision it relied on was the right to equitable use.
The judgment does not mention the obligation not to cause significant
harm. 154
A second argument supporting the Watercourses Convention as
an accurate reflection of international water law rests on the
assumption that a treaty is not static when its intention is to provide
1 55
In
a framework agreement with intentionally broad provisions.
that sense, the relationship between equitable use and no significant
harm, as articulated in the Watercourses Convention, can evolve to
reflect contemporary understandings of international water law. That
may be true if states see the Watercourses Convention as an evolving
document, but given the scrutiny textual language received during
and after negotiations,1 56 it is not clear that member states intended
for their rights and duties under the Watercourses Convention to
evolve, especially if a mechanism for interpreting those evolving
rights and duties is not expressed.
A final limitation of the relationship between equitable use and
no significant harm, as defined in the Watercourses Convention, is
that it assumes states are in a cooperative mood. If the principles are
intentionally ambiguous so as to give cooperative agreements the
maximum amount of flexibility, the unintended consequence is that
ambiguity also provides states in conflict with broad parameters
15 7
In that sense the
within which to reasonably assert their rights.
Watercourses Convention is useful insofar as it reinforces and
legitimizes successfully negotiated watercourse agreements, but less
constructive in providing tools to states in protracted disputes. That

85
See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 53,
154.
(Sept. 25) (explaining the court's rationale).
See, e.g., McIntyre & Tignino, supra note 149.
155.
See, e.g., Summary Records of the 61st and 62d Meetings of the Sixth
156.
(Legal) Committee, supra note 141; see also U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg.,
supra note 64 (including comments by a French delegate expressing concerns about the
hurried negotiations, noting "the fact that the draft Convention submitted by the
Chairman to the Working Group for adoption was not regularly circulated in various
languages, resulting in continuing uncertainties with regard to the original text, which
was adopted.").
See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
157.
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) (explaining that there is a general duty to cooperate
under international law that may dissuade states from taking unfounded positions,
though the principles of equitable use and no significant harm are broad enough that
incompatible positions may both be reasonable-the case of the Nile River Basin
discussed below is one example.)
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is not an inappropriate trade-off, but it is a limitation nonetheless. A
more explicit definition of rights may not resolve disputes between
neighbors intent on protecting their short-term interests, but it does
provide affected states with legal and diplomatic grounds to protect
their water resources.
Despite its limitations, the Watercourses Convention has
meaningful strengths as a framework agreement. Most notably, Part
III on Planned Measures creates several process-oriented rules on
information exchange, notification, and consultation. 5 8 While some
states expressed concern that these provisions would require
approval from co-riparian watercourse states for uses of, or actions in,
a watercourse,1 59 that interpretation exaggerates the practical effects
of the planned measures provisions.1 60 The provisions for information
exchange, notification, and consultation are straightforward,
verifiable, not unduly burdensome, and line up seamlessly with the
Watercourses Convention's goal of promoting cooperation between
watercourse states. 16 1
The same cannot be said, however, for the foundational
principles of the Watercourses Convention-the right to equitable
use, and the obligation not to cause significant harm. These principles
are ambiguously defined, inherently in tension with each other, and
broad enough to provide states in conflict over water resources with
reasonable arguments to support mutually incompatible positions.
These characteristics limit the effectiveness of the Watercourses
Convention in providing a meaningful framework for agreement
formation. In addition, competing treaty regimes-namely the
UNECE Water Convention and the Draft Articles-obscure the state
of international water law by promoting overlapping and conflicting
principles. The UNECE Water Convention, in particular, creates a
parallel framework treaty of international water law that will
compete with the Watercourses Convention for member states,
resources, and legal supremacy. Finally, the Watercourses
Convention suffers from a lack of support from UN member states.
Adopted in 1997, seventeen years went by before it became a binding

158.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supranote 14, pt. III.
159.
See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., supra note 64, at 4-5
(providing a statement from Turkey during the General Assembly resolution adopting
the UN Watercourses Convention, which expressed concern that the Convention
"creates an obvious inequality between States . . . .").
160.
See Salman, supra note 143, at 30-32. The provisions enable a notified
state to delay the planned measure, but do not create a veto because under Article 13, a
notified state has 6 months to investigate the planned measure; if the notified state
objects to the planned measure, Article 17(1) requires the states in question to enter
into consultations, during which the objecting state can request a 6-month grace
period. Id.
161.
See Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Alexander Lopez, Factors That Could Limit the
Effectiveness of the UN Watercourses Convention Upon its Entry Into Force, in THE UN
WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE, supra note 143, at 87-92.
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treaty. This delay reduced the Watercourses Convention's standing
and cast doubt on its contributions to international water law. In the
next section, the Water Convention's limitations are brought to light
by negotiations over management of the longest river in the world.
IV. LIMITATIONS EXPOSED: THE CASE OF THE NILE RIVER BASIN

Nowhere are the limitations of the Watercourses Conventionand international water law in general-more apparent than in the
Nile River Basin.162 The Nile River Basin is a classic example of the
upstream vs. downstream, equitable use vs. no significant harm
dilemma. Egypt and Sudan-both downstream states and historically
regional hegemons over the Nile River Basin-have long been in
conflict with the upstream community of states in the basin, with
much at stake. Eleven countries fall within the Nile River Basin, with
a total population of 350 million. 163 Many of these countries have
considerable development challenges, and rely on the social,
economic, and environmental benefits of the Nile River's water
resources; 70 percent of the Nile River Basin's population relies on
rain-fed agriculture for their livelihoods.1 64 As a result, there has
been a reduction in soil fertility and dry season flows, while droughts
and floods put vulnerable populations at further risk of food
insecurity. Not surprisingly, the Nile River Basin is viewed as one of
the most degraded in the world, due to rapid population growth,
poverty, natural disasters, political instability, and poor watershed
management.' 6 5 In this context, a regional interstate agreement or
compact becomes a critical tool for addressing basin-wide water
allocations. Unfortunately, the framework for cooperation the
Watercourses Convention provides, and the legal principles it
promotes, are insufficiently robust to overcome long-standing
hydropolitical discord.
Recent events in the Nile River Basin reveal the central role that
Nile waters play in high-stakes geopolitical developments. Domestic
upheaval in Egypt has weakened the Nile River Basin's regional

162.
This section updates, and builds on, Ryan Stoa, International Water Law
Principles and Frameworks: Perspectives from the Nile River Basin, in NILE RIVER
BASIN: ECOHYDROLOGICAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HYDROPOLITICS 581
(Assefa M. Melesse, Wossenu Abtew & Shimelis Setegn eds., 2014).
163.
Assefa M. Melesse, Seleshi Bekele & P. McCormick, Introduction:
Hydrology of the Niles in the Face of Climate and Land-Use Dynamics, in NILE RIVER
BASIN: HYDROLOGY, CLIMATE AND WATER USE vii, vii (Assefa M. Melesse ed., 2011)

("The Nile river basin is home to approximately 180 million people, while over 350
million live within the 10 riparian states.").
164.
Id. at xii.
165.
See id.
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hegemon as political factions wrestle for control of the country. 166
Despite rapid domestic political changes resulting in deadly protests
and potential human rights violations, however, Egypt's stance
towards upstream riparian states of the Nile River Basin has been
consistently aggressive, regardless of who holds power in Cairo.
Before stepping down amid sustained protests in February 2011,
former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had received permission
from Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to build an Egyptian air
base in Sudan that would be used to conduct bombing raids on
Ethiopian hydroelectric facilities on the Nile River. 167 It is believed
that Egypt's opposition to an independent South Sudan-as well as
Ethiopia's support for independence-was grounded on the
assumption that South Sudan would join the upstream bloc of Nile
River Basin states.168 In June 2013, weeks before being deposed by
military forces, former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi made a
televised speech to assert that all options were open to ensure that
Egypt's water security remained intact despite the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam's construction on the Nile River.16 9 If Egypt's Nile
River water allocation "diminishes by one drop, then our blood is the
alternative," he declared.170 Current President of Egypt (and former
Army Field Marshall) Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, meanwhile, launched an

166.
See generally, e.g., Patrick Kingsley, Egypt's Spring 2014: Is the CounterRevolution Now Complete?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/mar/23/egypt-spring-2014-counter-revolution [http://perma.cclUH84-3FM8]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) (describing "the return of a form of authoritarian rule" to
Egypt). Army Field Marshall Abdel Fattah al-Sisi claimed the presidency through
national elections held in May 2014. See Egypt Issues Presidential Election Law, AL
JAZEERA (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/egyptpresidential-election-law-20143814 1520330512.html
[http://perma.cc/LQ7S-R5QX]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) (reporting on the selection of Marshall Abdel Fattah as-Sisi to
the Egyptian Presidency following national elections); Patrick Kingsley & Martin
Chulov, Mohamed Morsi Ousted in Egypt's Second Revolution in Two Years, GUARDIAN
(July 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egyptsecond-revolution [http://perma.cc/L5W7-A67U] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (recounting the
removal of Mohammed Morsi from Egypt's Presidency); David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt
Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all
[http://perma.cc/AD8M-8PUE] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing Mubarak's fall
from power).
167.
See Noel, Stratfor Sources Reveal Egypt, Sudan Contingency Plans to
Secure Nile Water Resources, WIKILEAKS PRESS (Aug. 31, 2012), http://wikileakspress.org/stratfor-sources-reveal-egypt-sudan-contingency-plans-to-secure-nile-waterresources/ [http://perma.cc/BJ54-9U22] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (outlining Egyptian
and Sudanese contingency plans to engage in water resource acquisition).
168.
See id. (providing a snapshot of the political landscape at the time
regarding water resources).
169.
See Egyptian Warning Over Ethiopia Nile Dam, BBC (June 10, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22850124
[http://perma.cc/GP5K-HLGA]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing Morsi's speech regarding Egypt's water scarcity
and security).
170.
Id.
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international diplomatic offensive in February 2014 aimed at
neutralizing financial supporters of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam.171 If there is one issue all political factions in Egypt appear to
agree upon, it is staunch opposition to upstream water diversions.
On a basic level, water conflicts in the Nile River Basin can be
attributed to two simultaneous realities: (1) upstream states provide
virtually all of the total flow of the Nile River Basin's waters; 172 and
(2) downstream Egypt and Sudan have historically claimed the entire
flow for their use.173 While tensions over the Nile's resources go back
centuries, contemporary disputes have, at their root, the framework
legal imprints of British colonialism. The thrust of most early
agreements aimed to maximize downstream flows by preventing
upstream states from disturbing the uninterrupted flow of water
resources to Egypt without the prior consent of downstream Egypt,
Sudan, or the British government. The 1902 Treaty between Ethiopia
and the United Kingdom, Relative to the Frontiers between the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, for example, precludes
the construction of any project that would alter downstream flows
without the prior consent of the British and Sudanese
governments.174 Similarly, the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between
Egypt and Britain (representing Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and
Sudan) categorically prohibits any engineering works that could
jeopardize the interests of Egypt either by reducing water flows,
water levels, or flow schedules. 175 Both treaties invoke literal
interpretations of the no-significant harm principle.1 76
Upstream states have rejected the legal validity of these
agreements by claiming that because the agreements were imposed
by British rule and because these upstream states were not party to

171.
See Lora Moftah, Egypt Ramps Up International Campaign as Nile
Tensions Heat Up, BLOUIN BEAT: WORLD (Feb. 28, 2014), http:/Iblogs.blouinnews.com/
blouinbeatworld/2014/02/28/egypt-ramps-up-international-campaign-as-nile-tensionsheat-up/ [http://perma.cc/M9N-KCWS] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (describing Egyptian
military action regarding Nile access).
172.
See Stoa, supra note 163, at vii (highlighting the two major tributaries in
Central Africa).
173.
See generally Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, EgyptSudan, Nov. 8, 1959, 6519 U.N.T.S. 63 (delineating an agreement between Egypt and
Sudan for full utilization of the Nile waters).
174.
Treaty between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, Relative to the
Frontiers between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Eth.-U.K., May
15, 1902.
175.
Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom and the Egyptian Government in Regard to the Use of the Waters of the
River Nile for Irrigation Purposes (Nile Waters Agreement), Egypt-U.K., May 7, 1929,
available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/EgyptUK
.Nile Agreement-1929.html [http://perma.cc/D99H-X5MC] (archived Sept. 14, 2014)
(discussing the categorical prohibitions resulting from the Nile Waters Agreement).
176.
See generally Berlin Rules, supra note 37 (providing legal mechanisms for
cooperative management of waters and for resolving disputes peacefully).
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the agreements, they therefore are not bound by them.' 7 7 Ethiopia
rejected the 1902 treaty, for example, because it was not ratified by
any of its government bodies. 178 Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanganyika/Tanzania invoked the Nyerere Doctrine-giving states
two years to renegotiate colonial-era treaties before they become
invalid-to reject the 1929 Agreement.179 Egypt rests on the principle
of state succession, which transfers the rights and obligations of a
predecessor state to a successor state, to claim that the treaties are
still valid.18 0 Egypt's argument may have been weakened by the 1978
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties,
which established that newly independent post-colonial states do not
inherit the treaty obligations of their colonial predecessors.18 While
Egypt is a party to the Vienna Convention, however, Ethiopia is the
only upstream treaty member,182 precluding other upstream states
from enjoying its legal provisions. Meanwhile, when Ethiopia signed
the 1902 treaty between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, it was an
independent state under the rule of Emperor Menelik II.1 83 Both
agreements remain points of contention today.
Tensions reached a head in 1959, when Egypt and Sudan created
the bilateral Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the
Republic of Sudan for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, dividing
the entire flow of the Nile River Basin to themselves.184 The 1959
agreement is understandably rejected by all other riparian states,
which assert the principle of equitable use to claim that the
agreement is an infringement on their rights under international law
(in addition to the fact that they are not parties to the treaty).

177.
See Salman M.A. Salman, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework
Agreement: A Peacefully Unfolding African Spring?, 38 WATER INT'L 17, 18 (2013)
(explaining that treaties concerning the Nile River have "been a source of bitter dispute
between Ethiopia and Egypt").
178.
See id. at 18 ("Ethiopia vehemently rejects this treaty, claiming that it was
not ratified by any of the government organs and that the Amharic and English
versions of the treaty are different with respect to the said article.").
179.
See id.
180.
See id. at 19.
181.
See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 8,
Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3, 17 I.L.M. 1488 ("The obligations or rights of a
predecessor State under treaties in force . . . do not become the obligations or rights of
the successor State .... ).
182.
See Status of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties,

UNITED

NATIONS

TREATY

COLLECTION,

https://treaties.un.org/pages/

ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg.no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&lang=en (last visited
Sept. 21, 2014) [http://perma.cc/3GFW-W37K] (archived Sept. 21, 2014) (listing the
States party to the Vienna Convention).
183.
See Salman, supra note 177, at 17.
184.
See Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Egypt-Sudan,
supra note 173, at 1 ("[T]he River Nile needs projects, for its full control and for
increasing its yield for the full utilization of its waters by the Republic of the Sudan
and the United Arab Republic. . . .").

2014]

UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE

1357

Up to this point, the international agreements governing water
resources of the Nile River Basin heavily favored downstream Egypt
and Sudan by asserting the principle of no significant harm to the
exclusion of upstream riparian states' potential right to an equitable
use of the Nile River Basin's waters. Accordingly, the agreements
lacked consensus and legitimacy, and there was little cooperation
between the upstream and downstream riparian states on matters of
transboundary water resources management. At this point, the
creation and adoption of a treaty capable of reconciling the competing
principles invoked by upstream vs. downstream states could have
played a potentially critical role in resolving the dispute. The
Watercourses Convention, however, largely failed to gain acceptance
in the Nile River Basin. At present, the Watercourses Convention has
not been ratified by a Nile River Basin state.18 5 That, in itself, is not a
determinative rejection of the Watercourses Convention. States may
simply be dragging their feet or focusing on other priorities. The
meeting records of the General Assembly resolution, however, reveal
a conspicuous lack of support from Nile River Basin states. 18 6 Egypt,
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Rwanda abstained from the vote, and
Burundi was one of only three countries to vote against the
resolution. 187 In explaining its abstention, Ethiopia expressed
dissatisfaction with the force-or lack thereof-with which the
Watercourses Convention establishes the right of equitable use, as
well as the text's neutral stance on existing agreements that
contravene its principles.188 Not surprisingly, the Egyptian delegation
expressed their concerns that the right of equitable use is not
appropriately linked to the prohibition on significant harm.1 89 Thus,
even at the apex of international support for the Watercourses
Convention, its provisions were not palatable to states in the Nile
River Basin.
Nonetheless, changes in the environment, support from
intergovernmental institutions, and increased assertiveness from
upstream states led to a slight, but significant, shift towards a
cooperative management framework through bilateral agreements,
technical knowledge exchange, and sub-basin level organizations.19 0

185.
See Status of Watercourses Convention, supra note 6 (listing the States that
are party to the UN Watercourses Convention).
186.
See generally U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., supra note 64
(discussing at length those abstaining from the vote).
187.
See id.
188.
See id. at 9-10 ("[Ethiopia] took this position because ... the text of the
Convention . . . falls short of achieving the required balance, in particular safeguarding
the interests of upper riparian States such as Ethiopia.").
189.
See id. at 10-11 ("[Egypt emphasizes] the need to link [equitable sharing]
with the obligations of the States of a given river not to cause significant harm.").
190.
The most illustrative example is the Hydro-meteorological Survey of the
Equatorial Lakes project, or Hydromet. Hydromet was created in response to
unexpected rainfall and natural disasters in the Nile River Basin. While it provided a
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While the regional or technical initiatives had their limitations, they
were instrumental in laying the foundation for the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI). 191 The NBI--officially established in 1999-is a
framework partnership intended to formally convene the Nile River
Basin riparian states to engage in dialogue and work towards a
permanent and binding management framework. 192 With the
enduring participation of ten riparian states (Eritrea is an
observer), 193 the NBI represented a significant shift towards
cooperative management of the Nile River Basin. 194 To this day the
NBI provides the basin with a robust intergovernmental organization
with ongoing programs and administrative institutions.
The guiding philosophy of the NBI is stated in what NBI
formally titles its "Shared Vision": "[T]o achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and
benefits from, the common Nile Basin water resources." 195 The
Shared Vision features prominently throughout the NBI's official
documents, programs, and publications, and serves as the tagline of
the NBI's official website. The significance of the Shared Vision
should not be understated. It is the de facto mission statement of the
most inclusive cooperative management framework of the Nile River
Basin to date, and it unequivocally embraces the equitable use
principle. Its characterization of the Nile River Basin's water
resources as "common" refutes the notion that Egypt and Sudan have
priority use to the entirety of the basin's flow.
Given the bipolar history of Nile River Basin negotiations, the
existence of the NBI should be considered a remarkable achievement.
mechanism for transboundary cooperation, the project was limited to technical experts
and knowledge exchange. Other attempts at cooperation included the Undugu
Initiative, an Egyptian-led communication forum, and the Technical Cooperation
Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the
Nile (TECCONILE), an initially technical and scientific body which gradually
promoted legal and institutional reform. See generally Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen, The
Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a
'Water Security" Paradigm:Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac?, 21 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 421 (2010).
191.
See Nile Basin Initiative: About Us, NILEBASIN.ORG, http://nilebasin.org/
index.php/about-us/nile-basin-initiative (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) [http://perma.cc/
T3CM-5JZJ] (archived Sept. 21, 2014) ("The Nile Basin Initiative is a regional
intergovernmental partnership that seeks to develop the River Nile in a cooperative
manner. . . .").
192.
See id. (explaining that the NBI's objective is "to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common
Nile Basin water resources").
193.
See id. (listing the ten riparian states-Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, The Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda-and
noting that "Eritrea participates as an observer.").
194.
See generally Jutta Brunnee & Stephen Toope, The Changing Nile Basin
Regime: Does Law Matter?, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 107 (2002) (discussing how new laws
and cooperative regimes have transformed the way the Nile River Basin is being
managed).
195.
Nile Basin Initiative, supra note 191.

20141

UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE

1359

It is broadly inclusive of the basin's riparian states, remains active
through ministerial and diplomatic engagements and on-the-ground
programming, and receives technical and financial support from a
diverse donor-base. Ultimately, however, the purpose of the NBI is to
create and transition to a binding transboundary management
agreement-namely, the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework
Agreement (CFA)196-that formalizes the NBI as an institution and
clarifies the relationships and water rights of riparian states. By this
measure, the NBI's record is decidedly mixed. While negotiations to
conclude the CFA were initiated concurrently with the NBI's
establishment, fourteen years later the CFA is at an impasse: seven
upstream states have signed the agreement, but the CFA has not
97
At
entered into force, and it lacks the support of Egypt and Sudan.
principles
legal
over
disagreements
the heart of the stalemate are
that merely reflect the long-standing disagreements between
upstream and downstream riparian states.
On its face, the CFA largely reflects the legal provisions of the
Watercourses Convention. Article 4 lays out the provisions of the
equitable use principle, as well as a list of factors to be used in
determining if a use is equitable and reasonable. 198 Article 5,
99
meanwhile, establishes the principle of no significant harm.' Where
the Watercourses Convention is silent with respect to the interplay
between the two principles (or, at best, relies on the principle of state
cooperation to balance competing uses), the CFA makes an attempt at
reconciling equitable use and no significant harm by creating a third
0
legal principle: water security. 20 The CFA defines water security as
"the right of all Nile Basin States to reliable access to and use of the
Nile River system for health, agriculture, livelihoods, production and

See Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework art. 30
196.
(May 14, 2010) [hereinafter CFA], available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
documents/regionaldocs/NileRiverBasinCooperative_-Framework 2010.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H4Z9-8U3E] (archived Sept. 21, 2014) ("Upon the entry into force of
this Framework the Commission shall succeed to all rights, obligations and assets of
the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).").
See Abadir M. Ibrahim, Note, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework
197.
Agreement: The Beginning of the End of Egyptian Hydro-PoliticalHegemony, 18 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 282, 301-05 (2011) ("It is not clear if the upper riparian states
actually expect Egypt to cave in to this pressure, but it is clear that they expect South
Sudan and eventually North Sudan to sign the deal."); Scott 0. McKenzie, Note,
Egypt's Choice: From the Basin Treaty to the Cooperative Framework Agreement, An
InternationalLegal Analysis, 21 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 571, 584-85 (2012)
("While Egypt's words and actions suggest that it is highly uninterested in signing the
CFA, other basin countries have welcomed Egyptian participation.").
See CFA, supra note 196, art. 4 (providing boundaries for the equitable use
198.
principle and factors useful in making such determinations).
See id. art. 5 ("Nile Basin States shall ... take all appropriate measures to
199.
prevent the causing of significant harm to other Basin States.").
See id. art. 2(f) (establishing Water Security as a key component of the
200.
agreement).
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environment." 201 The application of water security as a legal
principle, however, could not be agreed upon. 202 Article 14(b) of the
CFA initially required states "not to significantly affect the water
security of any other Nile Basin State." 203 Egypt and Sudan, however,
required the clause be amended to obligate states "not to adversely
affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other
Nile Basin State."204 Essentially, the concept of water security was
used as a proxy by upstream states to reinforce the principle of
equitable use, and by downstream Egypt and Sudan to affirm their
pre-existing claims to the entire flow of the basin based on the no
significant harm principle. Disagreement over the appropriate
application of the principle of water security-and by extension, the
interplay between the principles of equitable use and no significant
harm-have led to an impasse in negotiations.
While the dispute over water security is likely the greatest
hurdle to full participation, other provisions of the CFA have
contributed to the deadlock. Egypt and Sudan have called for robust
notification procedures to be incorporated, 205 in line with similar
provisions of the Watercourses Convention. Upstream states are
concerned that notification requirements will be construed as
recognition of colonial-era agreements. 206 Regarding amendment
procedures, upstream states prefer a simple majority requirement,
while Sudan and Egypt demand veto power. 20 7 Even the definition of
the basin itself is in dispute. Egypt seeks to broaden the definition to
include all waters accumulating in the basin area, an interpretation
that would render Egypt's water allocation claims from 66 percent of
the river flow-as established in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement
between Egypt and Sudan-to a more reasonable 3 percent. 208 The
upstream states have yet to accept this interpretation. 209
Despite the deadlock, the CFA has been signed by seven
countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, South
Sudan, and Burundi; it has been ratified by two: Ethiopia and
201.
Id.
202.
Interview with Mahmoud Elkhatib, Second Secretary of the Embassy of
Egypt in the United States (Feb. 14, 2014).
203.
CFA, supra note 196, Annex to art. 14(b).
204.
Musa Mohammed Abseno, Nile River Basin, in THE UN WATERCOURSES
CONVENTION IN FORCE, supra note 143, at 149.
205.
See Salman, supra note 177, at 22 ("Egypt and Sudan demand that the
CFA include explicit provisions on the notification of other riparians of planned
measures which may cause significant adverse effects to other riparians.").
206.
See id.
207.
See id. at 23 ("While Sudan and Egypt demand that the CFA be amendable
by consensus ... the other riparians insist that it be amendable by a simple majority of
the riparian states ... with no veto power for any riparian.").
208.
See id. at 23 (noting that Egypt would include in the definition "the rain
that falls on the entire basin area").
209.
See id. ("If Egypt insists on this definition, it will certainly infuriate the
other riparians, who consider it absurd.").
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Rwanda. 210 Further ratifications from Kenya, South Sudan, and
Tanzania may be imminent.21 1 If the CFA receives the requisite six
ratifications to enter into force, the creation of the Nile Basin
Commission will be triggered and succeed the NBI. Without the
participation of Egypt and Sudan, however, the CFA and Nile Basin
Commission will struggle to resolve disputes over water resources in
the basin, a reality the ongoing conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia
reflects.
With Egypt publically proclaiming the possibility of war over the
Nile River Basin's water resources and Ethiopia building momentum
for entry into force of an agreement untenable to Egypt and Sudan,
prospects for cooperation have never seemed more remote. The
dispute centers on the ambiguous relationship between the two
foundational principles of the Watercourses Convention, a
relationship that lacks clarification and guidance for states in
seemingly intractable positions. As the longest river in the world, and
arguably the most geopolitically significant river basin lacking a
cooperative management agreement, the Nile River Basin's
experience with principles of international water law are a telling
barometer of the Watercourses Convention's ability to resolve
disputes and foster agreement. While it is understood that one of the
primary purposes of international water law is to provide a
framework for willing states to create their own, more fact-specific
regional agreements, the Watercourses Convention has not equipped
states in the Nile River Basin with the necessary tools to resolve their
disputes. On the contrary, the ambiguous relationship between the
principles of equitable use and no significant harm allows states to
invoke whichever principle best suits their needs. Downstream states
like Egypt and Sudan will emphasize the principle of no significant
harm to prevent upstream utilization, while upstream states will
emphasize the principle of equitable use to legitimize their diversions.
CFA negotiations have demonstrated that, even when
negotiating in good faith, the lack of clarity in international water
law and the Watercourses Convention may lead to intractable
outcomes. The fact that riparian states of the Nile River Basin felt
compelled to create an entirely novel legal concept to resolve the

210.
See Yonas Abiye, Ethiopia: Kenya Closer to Ratifying the CFA Bill On the
Nile, ALLAFRICA.COM (Mar. 15, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201403170561.html
[http://perma.cc/8AEL-CB5L] (archived Sept. 21, 2014).
See Abiye, supra note 210 (quoting officials who imply a sense of
211.
forthcoming ratification); Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Welcomes Tanzania's Move to Ratify
the Nile Treaty, ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 11, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/
201410131328.html [http://perma.cc/YMT5-5YLF] (archived Oct. 25, 2014) (discussing
Tanzania's prospects). For a discussion of newly independent South Sudan's options
under international water law, see Charles L. Katz, Note, Another Cup at the Nile's
Crowded Spigot: South Sudan and its Nile Water Rights, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L., 1249
(2013).
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discrepancies between existing legal principles is an indictment of the
pre-existing legal tools available. The concept of water security
quickly became a proxy for incompatible positions, an outcome the
Watercourses Convention did not prevent. If the principles of the
Watercourses Convention are intended to be translated into sitespecific regional agreements, the fact that they may presently
obscure, rather than clarify, basic rights and obligations of Nile River
Basin states does not bode well for the future viability of the
Watercourses Convention.
Similarly, if legal principles provide ammunition for states to
take hardline negotiating positions, their value added to
international disputes is severely diminished. While that may appear
to be the case in the Nile River Basin, the influence of historical
experience should not be underestimated. Egypt and Sudan's
vehement opposition to the principle of equitable use is not simply the
product of their status as a downstream state. It is also the
consequence of geopolitical supremacy and colonial privileges.
Upstream states of the Nile River Basin would be at a significant
disadvantage vis-A-vis their downstream neighbors if international
water law did not support the idea that a country may make
reasonable and equitable utilization of its territory's water resources.
In the last ten to twenty years, upstream states have progressively
challenged Egypt and Sudan. While economic development,
population growth, and environmental uncertainty have contributed
to the shift in political dynamics, the continued development and
acceptance of customary water laws, such as the equitable use
principle, have given upstream states a legitimate legal leg to stand
on.
Ultimately, the principle of equitable use is not just a guiding
philosophy of international water law but of international
environmental laws governing natural resources in general.21 2 States
have traditionally supported-and in many cases, vigorously
defended-the notion of territorial sovereignty that allows them to
utilize natural resources. 213 Contemporary understandings of
environmental processes have demonstrated the need for cooperation
over transboundary resources and incentivized states to manage

212.
See Lilian del Castillo-Laborde, Equitable Utilization of Shared Resources,
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW T A. 1 (last updated Jan.
2010), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-el583?rskey=Xcvwjj&result=1&prd=EPIL [httpJpermar/M8X4-NMWG]
(archived Sept. 21, 2014).
213.
See, e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 12, art. 3 ("Each aquifer State has
sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located
within its territory."); UN Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 ([T]he coastal State has ... sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources. . . .").
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214
But the Egyptian and Sudanese reliance
resources cooperatively.
on the no significant harm principle to object to any utilization of
water resources by upstream riparian states is likely a
misconstruction of the principle. Since the principles of equitable use
and no significant harm first appeared side-by-side in the
Watercourses Convention, they have remained together in every
subsequent major international legal instrument. It is clear that both
principles operate in tandem, and ideally should be interpreted as
checks on one another. In practice that ideal is not as
straightforward.
At present, however, prospects for cooperation in the Nile River
Basin appear slim, with upstream states intent on pushing forward
with the CFA as presently constructed without the support and
2 15
If the CFA enters into force
participation of Egypt and Sudan.
without the full participation of Nile River Basin states, an element
of cooperation will be lost, as the CFA's implementing institutionthe Nile Basin Commission-will succeed the NBI and assume the
NBI's rights and responsibilities. Consequently, the Nile River Basin
will lose its primary mechanism for coordination and transboundary
management. Many of the NBI's current programs will presumably
transition to the Nile Basin Commission, though how this will
proceed without the full participation of Nile River Basin states is
unclear. What is clear is that upstream states are asserting their
rights under international water law, and are no longer hesitant to
publically oppose their downstream counterparts.
Meanwhile, Egypt's reaction to increased pressure from
upstream states to assert the principle of equitable use has been
invective. After centuries of enjoying nearly complete dominion over
the Nile's flow, Egypt and Sudan are facing a new Nile River Basin
paradigm. Based on widespread acceptance of the equitable use
principle, it is likely that the international community will be
sympathetic toward the upstream states, many of which are in low
levels of human development and receive heightened attention from
donor nations and the international community. Egypt and Sudan are
themselves key players, however, in a fragile and evolving Middle
East and North African region where major players like the United
States and European Union are consumed with explosive geopolitical
issues, and are therefore unlikely to spend their diplomatic capital
asserting the rights of upstream riparian states to an equitable
utilization of the Nile River Basin.

See GRAZIA BORRINI-FEYERABEND ET AL., SHARING POWER: A GLOBAL GUIDE
214.
TO COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES xxviii-xxix (2007)
(illustrating the evolution of resource management strategies in a continually
globalizing world).
See Abiye, supra note 210 ("[The States] are all committed to ensuring it is
215.
implemented in the shortest time possible, despite some hurdles.").
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At the same time, the conflict over water resources has become
sufficiently critical to warrant international attention, a development
that may present an opportunity for reconciliation. Following the
June 2013 exchange between Egypt and Ethiopia, the African Union
and the UN urged cooperation, with UN Secretary General Ban-Ki
Moon personally discussing the matter with the leaders of both
states. 216 Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Amr made an
official visit to Ethiopia on June 17, 2013, to resolve the dispute and
negotiate a mutually beneficial agreement. 2 17 Those talks, however,
may be irrelevant in light of Egypt's rapidly changing political
landscape.
As Egypt fights through a period of political transition, talks
between Egypt and Ethiopia have been put on hold, with Ethiopia set
to increase military spending by fifteen percent, 218 while Egypt
continues its international diplomatic campaign against the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. 219 Going forward, it is likely that
Egypt's governments, military or otherwise, will maintain long-held
legal claims to the Nile River Basin's water resources. In fact, conflict
with foreign rivals may be seen as an opportunity for Egyptian
leaders to stem the tide of domestic opposition and rally the country
in an "us vs. them" dynamic. At this time there is no indication that
Egypt will back down from its long-held positions. 220 At the same
time, support for the CFA from upstream states is growing
stronger. 22 1 If there is a way forward that reconciles these positions,
it has not yet emerged.2 22 The Watercourses Convention's embrace of

216.

See Kirubel Tadese,

Cloud Over Talks on Ethiopia's Nile Dam,

BUSINESSDAY: BDLIVE (June 18, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/africal
africannews/2013/06/18/cloud-over-talks-on-ethiopias-nile-dam
[http://perma.cc/86BAHDK] (archived Sept. 21, 2014) ("Egypt and Ethiopia began a sharp exchange of
words after Ethiopia . . . started to divert Nile waters . . ..

217.

See id.

218.

See Ethiopia to Boost Defense Spending Amid Tensions with Egypt Over

Nile Dam Development, STARTRIBUNE (July 3, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://
www.startribune.com/nation/214163921.html (reporting that Ethiopia was set to boost
defense spending by more than 15 percent); Moftah, supra note 171.
219.
See Moftah, supra note 171 ("Egypt's government is undertaking an
international diplomatic offensive aimed at thwarting [the dam].").
220.
See Interview with Mahmoud Elkhatib, supra note 202.
221.
See Abiye, supra note 210 (discussing the role of the upper riparian states
in implementing the CFA and citing signs of optimism).
222.
Although a legal solution seems remote, a better understanding of
hydrological dynamics may present an opportunity for cooperation. From an integrated
water resources management perspective, the primary water uses of the riparian
states involved are not incompatible despite the Nile River's limited flows. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi rely on waters of the Kagera
River Basin-an upper headwater of the Nile-for small-scale domestic water supply
and irrigation. Similarly, Tanzania and Kenya rely on the Nile's water resources to
satisfy some domestic water supply needs, while Uganda and Ethiopia are focused on
hydropower generation. An integrated water resources management framework can
regulate and satisfy these uses with minimal downstream effects on Sudan and Egypt.

20141

UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE

1365

the principles of equitable use and no significant harm provides little
hope of doing so.
The challenge for riparian states of the Nile River Basin is to
negotiate a binding legal agreement that effectively defines rights
and obligations, while providing a framework for enduring
management and cooperation. The bipolar
transboundary
interpretations of the Watercourses Convention and international
water law principles has led negotiations into the unfamiliar issue of
water security, a principle that merely serves as a proxy for states to
assert their best interests. Nonetheless, the CFA may be more
palatable to Nile River Basin states than current political dynamics
would suggest. The present form of the agreement has omitted the
controversial Article 14(b) water security clause, leaving it to the Nile
Basin Commission to resolve. 223 In addition, amendment procedures
were revised to require unanimity for the most essential articles
(including the principles of equitable use, no significant harm, and
water security), 224 and a two-thirds majority for all other
provisions. 225 Finally, while the CFA does not explicitly protect
historical allocations of Nile waters, an enumerated factor to consider
when determining equity is an existing use. Considering the
significant reliance of Egypt's population on Nile water resources,
this factor is likely to be heavily weighted when objectively balanced
against other factors. 226
If cooperation over the CFA can be achieved, ratifications of the
Watercourses Convention may follow soon thereafter. The principles
of equitable use, no significant harm, and cooperation over water
resources are present in both the CFA and the Watercourses
Convention, while donor programs are pushing for and supporting

Sudan partially recognized this possibility when it accepted the conclusion of a tenmember panel tasked with investigating the effects of the dam. The panel's findings
included a determination that downstream Egypt and Sudan will not be deleteriously
affected, and may even benefit from reductions of siltation and 'flooding. For a lengthier
discussion of the opportunities an understanding of hydrological dynamics present, see
generally Hydropower'sPotential and the Region's Rising Energy Demand, in STATE OF
THE NILE RIVER BASIN 2012 163 (2012), available at http://nileis.nilebasin.org/
system/files/Nile%2OSoB%2OReport%2OChapter%206%20-%20%2OHydropower.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8XEC-74A8] (archived Sept. 21, 2014); Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "No political
motive" Behind Sudan's Support for Ethiopia's Nile Dam: Ambassador, SUDAN
TRIBUNE (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49180 [http://
perma.cc/833U-SZ9E] (archived Sept. 21, 2014).
See CFA, supra note 196, art. 14(b).
223.
See id. art. 35(3).
224.
See id. ("As to proposed amendments to other articles ... the amendment
225.
shall as a last resort be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the State
Parties.. .. ").
While not the primary argument Egypt relies on to assert its rights, the
226.
principle of equitable use is interpreted to support current allocations by emphasizing
existing uses by Egypt's large population. Interview with Mahmoud Elkhatib, supra
note 202.
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ratification. 227 Given the primary importance the Nile River Basin
has to water strategies of Nile River Basin states, however, it is
unlikely that accession to the Watercourses Convention will take
place on a regional scale before a consensus CFA is in place.
Ultimately, the CFA represents a binding and legal break from
Sudanese and Egyptian hegemony over the Nile River Basin. It may
take time for Egypt and Sudan to accept this new paradigm, and the
Watercourses Convention's status as a source of the rights and
obligations of upstream and downstream states may not be capable of
facilitating the transition. Meanwhile, the experience of the Nile
River Basin should illuminate that the relationship between the
foundational principles of the Watercourses Convention-equitable
use and no significant harm-is poorly defined and capable of
manipulation. While ambiguity may provide flexibility in some cases,
it creates confusion and, at worst, impedes conflict resolution. The
Nile River Basin demonstrates that the Watercourses Convention has
a long way to go before its provisions can foster cooperation in
protracted conflicts.

V. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: THE WAY
FORWARD

Despite the Watercourses Convention's limitations, there is
reason for optimism. Even when the treaty was non-binding, there
was evidence that its principles were being applied in bilateral and
regional agreements. 228 If the Watercourses Convention serves only
as a guidance document, it would still contribute to promoting
cooperation over transboundary water resources. Better still, with
thirty-five ratifications in hand, 22 9 entry into force has been achieved,

227.
See, e.g., Misa Mohammed Abseno, Regional Brief: The UN Watercourses
Convention Global Initiative for East Africa (June 4, 2013), available at http://
www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/images/2012/10/regional-brief-nile-basin-june2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/RY6N-4SKY (archived Sept. 21, 2014) ("Some of the most
important provisions are the definition of the term 'watercourse'; principle of equitable
and reasonable utilization; the obligation not to cause significant harm; data and
information exchange. . . .").
228.
See generally The 2002 Charter of Water of the Senegal River, 2002,
available at http://iea.uoregon.edulpages/view-treaty.php?t=2002-SenegalRiverWater
Charter.EN.txt&par=view treaty html [http://perma.cc/6C3R-4KWU] (archived Sept.
21, 2014) (evidencing that principles of the UN Watercourses Convention are being
applied in regional agreements); 2000 Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), 2000, available at http://
www.sadc.int/files/3413/6698/6218/RevisedProtocolonSharedWatercourses_-_2000
-_English.pdf [http://perma.cc/6AY7-8362] (archived Sept. 21, 2014); 2008 Niger Basin
Water Charter, Apr. 30, 2008.
229.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, art. 36 ("The present
convention shall enter into force . . . following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth
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and marks a significant breakthrough for transboundary cooperation
over water resources. Moreover, seventeen of . the Watercourses
Convention's thirty-five member states became parties to the treaty
since 2010,230 suggesting that momentum was building towards entry
into force and that momentum may represent a global push towards
consensus. Many of the more recent member states-including
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom-are active donors of
foreign aid and yield influential soft power that could mobilize
support for further ratifications. Finally, current member states are
predominantly located in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East,
increasing the likelihood that all riparians of a watercourse in those
regions are party to the Watercourses Convention and will embrace
the spirit of cooperation. 231
Entry into force is a significant milestone for the Watercourses
Convention, with several implications for its future status under
international law. First, entry into force makes the principles and
provisions of the text binding on member states. Even if watercourse
agreements are not immediately executed, the binding nature of the
Watercourses Convention could trigger meaningful interaction
between co-riparian member parties by making information-sharing,
notification, consultation, and dispute settlement provisions
mandatory. Subsequently, non-member states will have an
opportunity to evaluate the ramifications of the treaty on member
states, providing clarity regarding operational and interpretive
aspects of the Watercourses Convention. The evaluation period will
enable non-member states to be better informed regarding their
position on ratification. 232 It may, for example, reassure states that
accession to the Watercourses Convention merely creates a
framework for further cooperation, instead of dramatically altering
existing rights and duties. In addition, concrete applications of the
Watercourses Convention's provisions are likely to refine and clarify
textual ambiguities. In this sense, the incubation period immediately
following entry into force may provide the international community
with a better sense of what the Watercourses Convention can, and
cannot, do. As yet, the Watercourses Convention's potential has been
at least partly constrained by its heretofore non-binding status.
Second, entry into force should allow the Watercourses
Convention to re-enter global conversations about collective
management of shared resources, prompting the international
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.").
See Status of Watercourses Convention, supra note 6.
230.
The corollary to this trend is that no states in East Asia, Southeast Asia,
231.
Oceania, South America, or North America have ratified the UN Watercourses
Convention. See generally THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE, supra note
143.
Ending speculation, for example, that Part III of the convention on Planned
232.
Measures could grant states a veto over planned measures of other states.
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community to collectively reengage with the Watercourses
Convention by supporting negotiations, sharing information, and
weighing in on each state's interpretations of rights and duties. Even
if that engagement is not coordinated in action or unified in opinion,
it will serve the interests of the Watercourses Convention if the
international community pays attention to transboundary water
resources. Taken a step further, institutional mechanisms-such as a
conference of the parties-could be established to create guidelines on
implementation, develop amendments and protocols, and monitor
compliance. 233 Institutional support has the potential to catalyze
state ratifications by funding fora for negotiations and developing a
coordinated and global ratification strategy.2 3 4 A joint institution
between the Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water
Convention would be particularly helpful in creating synergies and
reducing institutional competition between the treaty regimes, and
might encourage states party to one treaty to ratify the other. 235
Finally, entry into force bestows on the Watercourses Convention
a renewed air of legitimacy that is sorely needed seventeen years
after its adoption. If the purpose of the Watercourses Convention is to
promote cooperation and watercourse agreements, 236 it must be
recognized and accepted as a legitimate instrument of international
law. Recognition may already be provided by the thirty-five states
that have ratified the convention, but for the rest, entry into force will
serve as a reminder that the Watercourses Convention has a role to
play and a contribution to make. 237 In that regard, there is still work
to do for the Watercourses Convention to attain the widespread
support that international environmental treaty contemporaries
enjoy. 238 But entry into force is a start, and provides an opportunity

233.
See Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke, An InstitutionalStructure
to Support the Implementation Process, in THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN
FORCE, supranote 143, at 263.
234.
In a manner similar to the UNECE Water Convention's supporting
infrastructure, for example. See generally Projects of Middle Asia, supra note 83;
Meeting of the Parties, supra note 84.
235.
It would be a promising sign for both treaties, for example, if the United
Kingdom-a UN Watercourses Convention member party-ratified the UNECE Water
Convention and if Russia-a UNECE Water Convention member party-ratified the
UN Watercourses Convention.
236.
See UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 14, pmbl., pt. III
("Expressing the conviction that a framework convention will ensure the utilization,
development, conservation,
management
and protection
of
international
watercourses .... ).
237.
See Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Alexander Lopez, Why Have States Joined the
UN Watercourses Convention?, in THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE,
supra note 143, at 36.
238.
See, e.g., supra notes 2-5 (illustrating robust support for other treaties that
are environmental in nature, including the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Convention
to Combat Desertification, and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change).
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for non-member states to ride the coattails of the Watercourses
Convention's entry into force in order to secure domestic support for
ratification.
If support for the Watercourses Convention remains low in five
to ten years, it is likely that one of the three limitations explored
above is responsible. That would be major cause for concern. Lack of
support from UN member states due to a change in positions since
1997 may suggest that the Watercourses Convention, as constituted,
does not address the needs of watercourses states, or insufficiently
reconciles inherent tensions between upstream and downstream
states.2 39 Alternatively, further development of, and support for, the
UNECE Water Convention in contrast with a lack of support for the
Watercourses Convention may signal that the UNECE Water
Convention is the vehicle best constructed to promote cooperation
over water resources. The same can be said for the Draft Articles on
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers-if states are enthusiastically
promoting the Draft Articles, a preference for sovereign management
of groundwater may be implied. Finally, if the right to an equitable
use of water resources and the obligation not to cause significant
harm continue to incite controversy and prove incapable of providing
states in conflict over water resources with the legal principles
needed to cooperate, the accuracy with which the Watercourses
Convention reflects international water law should be called into
question. Alternatively, the tools provided by international water law
to promote watercourse agreements should be revisited. And, of
course, some combination of all three limitations may be responsible
if the Watercourses Convention does not receive widespread support
following entry into force. Regardless of the cause, if the
Watercourses Convention does not receive the threshold level of
support necessary to establish a consensus framework for
international water resources management, it will be prudent to
monitor and revisit the limitations. There is a dire need for a treaty
capable of articulating and upholding international water law in a
manner that promotes cooperation between watercourse states. If the
Watercourses Convention is not capable of doing so, the international
community should evaluate the Watercourses Convention's viability,
as well as the foundations of international water law itself.
Thankfully, that time has not yet come. Instead, the
Watercourses Convention has been thrust into a new era, enjoying
the promise and momentum that comes along with entry into force.
While imperfect, the Watercourses Convention provides states with a

The UN Watercourses Convention does not, for example, address climate
239.
change or other hydrological dynamics that may necessitate review of existing
agreements. The need for mechanisms capable of addressing climate change has been
gaining increased attention since 1997. See Tim Stephens, Reimagining International
Water Law, 71 MD. L. REV. 20, 22-24 (2012).
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basic framework with which to structure more fact-specific regional
agreements. Without a treaty of any kind, states are relying on
interpretations of customary international law to legitimize their
claims, while looking to other treaty regimes, like the UNECE Water
Convention and the Draft Articles, to understand their rights and
obligations. A binding agreement should provide a more concrete
basis with which to cooperate. While the Watercourses Convention is
not a panacea for the multitude of water management challenges the
international community faces, and will continue to face in the
future, entry into force marks a significant milestone. Despite its
limitations, the Watercourses Convention is at the heart of the corpus
of international water law, and will inevitably shape its future.

